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By JOHN W. TEETER, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses an issue supposedly resolved many years
ago-the right of employees to wear union insignia in the workplace.
Since the infancy of the National Labor Relations Act' (the "Act")
workers have possessed, in principle, the right to wear union insignia
without fearing retaliation by their employers. 2 In practice, however,
this right has been constricted, undermined, and jeopardized by
numerous judicial and National Labor Relations Board ("Board")
decisions. Tribunals frequently have upheld employers' prohibitions
on union insignia by concluding that bans were necessary to maintain
production, avoid conflicts among employees, prevent accidents,
assure good customer relations, or serve other business goals.' Most
* Associate Professor, St. Mary's University School of Law. A.B. 1982, University of
Illinois at Chicago Circle; J.D. 1985, Harvard Law School. The author owes a special debt
of gratitude to Cheryl Michiko Kuwada for her inspiration. The author also would like to
thank Barbara E. Scharf for her research assistance.
Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
169 (1988)).
2 See infra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
3As an administrative law judge recently explained, union emblems may be prohibited
when "necessary to maintain production and discipline, diffuse employee dissension, insure
employee safety, protect machinery and products from damage, assist employee concentration,
or project a certain image to the public." Albertsons, Inc., 300 N.L.R.B. No. 142 (Dec. 21,
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of these decisions are unpersuasive because they strip workers of the
freedom to wear union insignia based on what frequently appear to
be ad hoc rationalizations by employers. Furthermore, these cases
commonly conflict with other decisions that uphold the right to wear
union emblems. As a consequence, at least three problems arise: (1)
litigation over this issue increases as the law becomes increasingly
opaque;4 (2) workers are wrongfully denied the opportunity to pro-
claim their union sympathies; and (3) the Board and courts send an
implicit message that the freedom to express union support is a
second-class right that employers may override by offering a pretex-
tual justification. This Article explores these problems and suggests
alternative approaches to the issue of union insignia in the work-
place.
Employers have asserted four primary justifications for banning
union buttons: (1) the need to protect the employer's customer
relations, 5 (2) the need to maintain discipline,6 (3) the need to assure
efficiency and production, 7 and (4) the need to prevent safety haz-
ards." The first two "justifications" should be repudiated by the
Board and courts because prohibiting union buttons to preserve an
employer's relationship with consumers or to prevent workplace
violence is normally unnecessary and unjust.9
The second two justifications, though not inherently unreason-
able, have been asserted in a discriminatory manner and in cases
devoid of any significant risk to production or safety. 10 To alleviate
this problem, the Board and courts should impose strict requirements
1990) (citations omitted).
Union insignia may also be prohibited on the grounds that they are profane or disparage
an employer's product. See infra notes 66, 76. This Article, however, focuses only on emblems
that proclaim pro-union sentiments or condemn strikebreaking.
4 Conflicting opinions of the Board and appellate courts foster litigation in at least two
ways. First, such conflict frustrates the informal settlement of cases because the parties cannot
confidently predict how their legal disputes would be resolved. Second, parties are encouraged
to appeal adverse decisions in the hope that the appellate tribunal will follow a contrary line
of authority. Much has been written concerning the role of legal uncertainty in breeding
litigation. See, e.g., RicaARD Posrim, EcoNowc ANALYsis OP LAW 511 (3d ed. 1986) (explain-
ing that when legal uncertainty is great, "there will be much litigation, including much appellate
litigation").
'See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
'See infra Part II.C.
'See infra Part II.D.
'See infra Parts II.A.1-3, B.1-3. As explained below, however, an employer should be
permitted to prohibit emblems that expressly call for acts of violence.
10 See infra Parts II.C.1-3, D.1-3.
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on employers that prohibit insignia on these grounds. By adopting
the approaches recommended in this Article, tribunals can clarify
the law, reduce litigation, and protect the right of workers to dem-
onstrate union support.
I. Tm RiGr TO WEAR UNION INSIGNIA
A. The Importance of the Right
The right to wear union emblems serves important collective and
individual needs. On the collective level, wearing union insignia
enhances group solidarity, encourages others to seek membership,
and testifies to union strength. On the individual level, wearing
insignia permits each worker to express union commitment and
demonstrate pride in membership. This benefits not only the group,
but the individual wearer as well. By engaging in this simple act of
reaffirmation, the worker assures both herself and others that they
belong to an entity devoted to protecting their statutory rights,
economic interests, and quest for dignity in their work.
B. The Supreme Court's Recognition of the Right
As a general principle, employees long have been entitled to
wear union emblems. In 1945, the landmark decision Republic Avi-
ation Corp. v. NLRB" explicitly recognized this right. In Republic
Aviation, the Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the Board 2
and court of appeals' 3 that the employer had violated sections 8(1)' 4
and 8(3)' of the Act by discharging three employees for wearing
' 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
Republic Aviation Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 1186 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 193 (2d Cir.
1944), affd, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
" Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 142 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1944), aff'd, 324 U.S. 793
(1945).
" National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198 § 8(I), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982)). This section provides that it is an unfair labor
practice for employers "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7 [29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982)]." Section 7 provides, in relevant part,
that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection."
,1 Id. § 8(a)(3) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)). This section provides, in
relevant part, that it is an unfair labor practice for employers "by discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization."
1991-92]
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union steward buttons. Quoting the Board's trial examiner, the
Court stated:
[Tihe respondent's employees ... were entirely deprived of their
normal right to "full freedom of association" in the plant on their
own time, the very time and place uniquely appropriate and almost
solely available to them therefor. The respondent's rule is therefore
in clear derogation of the rights of its employees guaranteed by
the Act.' 6
Such language is instructive, for it recognizes that the workplace
is an ideal forum for expressing union sympathies and that an
employee's freedom of association includes the right to wear union
insignia. The Court also quoted the Board's conclusion that 'the
right of employees to wear union insignia at work has long been
recognized as a reasonable and legitimate form of union activity,
and the respondent's curtailment of that right is clearly violative of
the Act."' 1 7
To this extent, Republic Aviation affirmed the right to wear
union insignia in the workplace. In a rather indirect fashion, how-
ever, the Court also planted the seeds for the defeasance of that
right. In its discussion of union solicitation in the workplace, the
Court explained the Board's approach:
"6 Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 801 n.6 (quoting Republic Aviation, 51 N.L.R.B. at
1195).
" Id. at 802 n.7 (quoting Republic Aviation, 51 N.L.R.B. at 1187-88). The Board based
this conclusion on Armour & Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 1100 (1938), which held that a union officer
was entitled to wear a button signifying his position in the labor organization and that the
employer therefore had violated the Act by discharging him for refusing to remove it. See
Republic Aviation, 51 N.L.R.B. at 1188. The trial examiner in Republic Aviation also
recognized that "[t]he right of employees to wear buttons showing their union affiliation upon
their employer's premises is established by the courts," citing NLRB v. Waterman Steamship
Corp., 309 U.S. 206 (1940) and Triplex Screw Co. v. NLRB, 117 F.2d 858 (6th Cir. 1941).
See Republic Aviation, 51 N.L.R.B. at 1199 & n.21. The employer in Republic Aviation did
not even challenge this basic rule. See id. Instead, it argued that it lawfully forbade the
employees from wearing union steward buttons because the union symbolized had not yet
been recognized as the employees' representative and it did not want to convey the impression
of favoring that union. See Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 793. The Court rejected the
employer's argument, however, for the reason given by the Board:
"We do not believe, that the wearing of a steward button is a representation
that the employer either approves or recognizes the union in question as the
representative of the employees, especially when, as here, there is no competing
labor organization in the plant. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record
herein that the respondent's employees so understood the steward buttons or
that the appearance of union stewards in the plant affected the normal operation
of the respondent's grievance procedure."
Id. at 802 n.7 (quoting Republic Aviation, 51 N.L.R.B. at 1187-88).
[VOL.. 80
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It is ... not within the province of an employer to promulgate
and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation by an employee
outside of working hours, although on company property. Such a
rule must be presumed to be an unreasonable impediment to self-
organization and therefore discriminatory in the absence of evi-
dence that special circumstances make the rule necessary in order
to maintain production or discipline.18
It is this "special circumstances" caveat that has engendered
decades of litigation and circumscribed the protection of union
activists. Employers have demonstrated an unceasing ability to argue
that the presence of union insignia undermines customer relations,
discipline, production, or workplace safety. For their part, the Board
and courts frequently have accepted such arguments without care-
fully assessing their validity. As a consequence, the right of workers
to wear union insignia has been relegated to a precarious and
subordinate status.
II. THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RIGHT TO WEAR UNION INSIGNIA
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB 9 retains considerable vitality
as many employers continue to be found guilty of unfair labor
practices for prohibiting union insignia.2° In many other instances,
however, employers have escaped liability by asserting that special
circumstances necessitated the prohibition. Although these purported
" Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 803-04 n.10 (quoting Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B.
828, 843-44 (1943)).
19 324 U.S. 793 (1945). For a discussion of the case, see supra Part I.B.
See, e.g., Sirangelo, 298 N.L.R.B. No. 141, 1989-90 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,130
(June 26, 1990) (employer ordered workers to remove union buttons and threatened to
discharge those that continued to wear them); Keystone Lamp Mfg. Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 626
(1987) (employer ordered employee to remove union button); Overnite Transp. Co., 254
N.L.R.B. 132 (1981) (employer asked worker as a "personal favor" to stop wearing Teamsters
t-shirt); McIndustries, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1298 (1976) (employer requested that employees
remove union buttons after union lost representation election); Trailmobile Div., Pullman
Inc., 160 N.L.R.B. 1348 (1966) (employer urged workers to remove union buttons), enforced
in relevant part, 389 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1968); Threads - Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 968 (1959)
(employer told employee wearing union button that he could be blackballed by textile industry);
Commercial Controls Corp., 118 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1957) (workers threatened with reprisals for
wearing union insignia), enforced per curiam, 258 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1958); Essex Wire Corp.,
113 N.L.R.B. 344 (1955) (employer required employees to remove United Mine Workers of
America buttons while permitting them to wear buttons supporting the incumbent union),
enforced, 245 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1957); Brown & Root, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1068 (1955)
(workers threatened and discharged for wearing union buttons and engaging in other protected
activities); Graber Mfg. Co., III N.L.R.B. 167 (1955) (worker asked to remove union button);
DeVilbiss Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1953) (prohibiting union t-shirts and buttons).
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justifications occasionally have validity, they often appear to be
artful pretenses accepted by tribunals insufficiently protective of the
workers' statutory rights.2' Cases allowing employers to prohibit
union insignia, therefore, merit examination, even though the task
may seem "like a weary pilgrimage amongst hints for nightmares."'
A. Avoiding Harm to Customer Relations
Employers frequently have banned union insignia on the grounds
that such displays of union loyalty could tarnish the company's
image and alienate customers. The appellate courts often have val-
idated this reasoning, refusing to enforce the Board's findings of an
unfair labor practice. Moreover, the Board itself has wavered in its
response to this issue. Without regard for consistency, the Board
has rejected this line of defense in some cases while accepting it in
others. This inconsistency has undermined the protection afforded
by section 723 of the Act and Republic Aviation.
1. Conflict Between the Board and Appellate Courts
Floridan Hotel of Tampa,2 first decided by the Board in 1961,
exemplifies both the ambiguities of the Board's approach and the
meddlesome role of the courts of appeals. In Floridan, unionized
workers at a hotel and restaurant began wearing small union pins
as part of an effort to increase membership. 25 The employer re-
sponded by posting the following notice:
BULLETIN
A number of guests have called to the attention of the Man-
agement that many employees are wearing union badges during
working hours and on uniforms.
We do not feel that it lends to the dignity of our Hotel for
employees to openly display badges of any sort, whether it be a
union badge, lodge, or what have you.
2, The National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)).
2 JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART Or DARmSS 14 (1963). Moreover, the reader may also be
left with Marlow's feeling of "a mournful and senseless delusion." Id. at 13.
- 29 U.S.C. § 157.
- 130 N.L.R.B. 1105 (1961), enforcement denied, 300 F.2d 204 (5th Cir.), on remand,
137 N.L.R.B. 1484 (1962), enforced as modified, 318 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1963).
11 See Floridan Hotel of Tampa, 130 N.L.R.B. 1105, 1109, 1111 (1961) (Floridan I),
enforcement denied, 300 F.2d 204 (5th Cir.) (Floridan II), on remand, 137 N.L.R.B. 1484
(1962) (Floridan III), enforced as modified, 318 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1963) (Floridan IV).
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Therefore, there is hereby established a rule that no badges of any
kind will be worn by any employee so that they may be seen by
any customer or guest.
Management
HOTEL FLORIDAN2
This notice was misleading in two ways. First, only one guest
had mentioned the pins to the employer. 27 Furthermore, notwith-
standing the notice's wording, the employer applied the new rule to
all employees, even if they had no contact with the hotel's patrons.28
The employer warned that workers continuing to wear pins would
be discharged or have to "suffer the consequences. '" 29
The employer defended its prohibition by claiming that the pins
detracted from the hotel's dignity and offended many of its guests.0
Even if true, that rationale could not excuse the rule's application
to employees that did not interact with patrons. 31 The Board there-
fore concluded that the employer had violated section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.12 However, the Board expressly refrained from deciding whether
the employer could prohibit employees that were in contact with
patrons from wearing the pins.33
The Fifth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order. 34 The
court argued that the employer's written rule applied only to em-
ployees interacting with the hotel's patrons and that "the Board's
determination that the rule prohibited the wearing of union insignia
by all employees ... [was] unsupported."35 The court then re-
manded the case so the Board could decide whether the employer
lawfully prohibited pin-wearing by employees in regular contact with
patrons. 36
2 Id. at I110.
" See id. at 1112. As the Board's trial examiner reasoned, "Certainly this one man,
who allegedly was rebuffed by the appearance of the pins, does not represent a true cross-
section of the opinion of the hotel guests." Id. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit later noted, "It
is not claimed that [the guest's observation] was in the nature of a complaint." Floridan IV,
318 F.2d at 546 n.I.
See Floridan I, 130 N.L.R.B. at 1106, 1111.
19 Id. at 1106.
See id. at 1111.
31 See id. at 1106, 1111.
-1 See id. at 1106-07. Section 8(a)(1) is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
3 See id. at 1107.
- See Floridan II, 300 F.2d at 205.
Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
3 See id.
1991-92]
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On remand, the Board decided that the employer's rule violated
the Act even as applied to such employees.3 7 The Board reasoned:
The right of employees to wear union insignia at work has long
been recognized as a protected activity. The promulgation of a rule
prohibiting the wearing of such buttons constitutes a violation of
Section 8(a)(1) in the absence of evidence of "special circum-
stances" showing that such a rule is necessary to maintain produc-
tion and discipline. No "special circumstances" appear to have
existed at the Respondent's hotel. As the facts show, there was no
strike, and there was no union animosity or friction between groups
of employees. The buttons were being worn only as part of the
recognized and certified Union's campaign to increase its member-
ship. Nor were the legends on the buttons provocative in any way.
Indeed, there is no contention that a prohibition against wearing
the buttons was in any way necessary to maintain employee disci-
pline. Moreover, the evidence does not support the Respondent's
assertion that the buttons, which were small, neat, and inconspic-
uous, detracted from the dignity of the hotel, and there is no
evidence that they caused any diminution of the Respondent's
business. Under these circumstances, we find that the fact that the
employees involved come in contact with hotel customers does not
constitute "special circumstances" as to deprive them of their right,
under the Act, to wear union buttons at work. 8
The Fifth Circuit then enforced the Board's order, albeit "with
the caveat that our approval is related specifically to the factual
situation here presented, or in a like or substantially related man-
ner." '39 Judge Lewis, however, dissented from even this grudging
enforcement. Lewis emphasized the hotel's need "to avoid customer
irritation," asserted that "unionism is a source of controversy,"
and argued that an employer should not be "required to await
diminution of business" before prohibiting union insignia.40 He
therefore would have denied enforcement of the Board's order to
the extent that it protected employees "in continuous and daily
contact with the public." '41
Taken as a whole, the Floridan opinions are less a reaffirmation
of the right to wear union insignia than a warning that this freedom
is highly precarious. The Board's second opinion pointedly observed
See Floridan III, 137 N.L.R.B. 1484, 1486.
Floridan III, 137 N.L.R.B. at 1486 (footnotes omitted).
Foridan IV, 318 F.2d at 548-49 (footnote omitted).
40 Id. at 549 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 550.
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that "special circumstances" could curtail this right, and the Fifth
Circuit's hesitant enforcement of the Board's ultimate order is hardly
reassuring to those committed to the protection of section 7 rights.
Indeed, Judge Lewis's dissent foreshadowed the approach of appel-
late courts that have overruled the Board based on speculative fears
of customer disgruntlement.
The Ninth Circuit's 1964 decision in NLRB v. Harrah's Club42
typifies this development. In Harrah's Club, an operator of casinos,
lounges, and restaurants maintained a longstanding rule providing
that "no emblems, badges, buttons, jewelry, or ornaments of any
kind, except name pins, shall be displayed on uniforms worn by
employees who come into contact with the public." 43 Having applied
this rule to other types of insignia, the employer also enforced it
when employees began wearing union buttons provided by their
collective bargaining representative. The employer warned that em-
ployees that insisted upon wearing these or other buttons would be
discharged."
The Board concluded that the employer's actions were unlawful.
As the Board explained:
There is no evidence that the union pins caused customer com-
plaints, occasioned any loss of business to Respondent, caused
friction between union and nonunion employees, or detracted from
the dignity of Respondent's business operation.
... Accordingly, for the reasons expressed in our Floridan deci-
sion, we find that Respondent's rule as applied to wearing union
insignia, violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act[.]45
The Ninth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order.46 The
court argued that the wearing of these union buttons was not
protected by section 7 of the Act because the employees already
were represented by a union and were not wearing the buttons as
part of a campaign to increase union membership or improve their
terms and conditions of employment.4 7 The court asserted:
- 337 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1964), denying enforcement to 143 N.L.R.B. 1356 (1963).
43 Harrah's Club, 143 N.L.R.B. 1356, 1369 (1963), enforcement denied, 337 F.2d 177
(gth dr. 1964).
" See id. at 1368-69.
41 Id. at 1356-57.
'6 See NLRB v. Harrah's Club, 337 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1964), denying enforcement to
143 N.L.R.B. 1356 (1963).
41 See id. at 178-79.
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The Supreme Court [in Republic Aviation] has held that the wear-
ing of union buttons comes under [section 7's protection] of "other
concerted activities." However, we do not think that the Supreme
Court intended to erect this into a rule which makes the wearing
of union buttons per se a guaranteed right. We think there must
be evidence of a purpose protected by the [Act] - i.e., collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. This record is totally
devoid of any evidence of such a purpose. On the contrary, the
only evidence on the question of purpose - the testimony of the
employees themselves - shows that they had no express purpose in
mind in wearing the buttons. There was no attempt to organize
the employees: they were already organized. There was no attempt
to wring from management better wages, hours, or working con-ditions .4
The court's argument reflects an impoverished understanding of
section 7. In addition to assuring workers the right to form unions
and bargain collectively, section 7 also guarantees the freedom "to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of ... other
mutual aid or protection." 49 Such broad language would clearly
seem to encompass the right of workers to nurture unity and collec-
tive strength by wearing insignia. The court's insistence that the
buttons be related to an immediate and specific objective ignores
the union's interest in maintaining loyalty and morale on a daily
basis.
Taking its cue from Judge Lewis's dissent in Floridan, the court
also emphasized the employer's desire to project a professional,
noncontroversial image to the public:
Most business establishments, particularly those which, like re-
spondent, furnish service rather than goods, try to project a certain
type of image to the public. One of the most essential elements in
that image is the appearance of its uniformed employees who
furnish that service in person to customers. The evidence shows
that respondent has paid close attention to its public image by a
uniform policy of long standing against the wearing of jewelry of
any kind on the uniform. Respondent should not be required to
wait until it receives complaints or suffers a decline in business to
prove special circumstances. Businessmen are required to anticipate
41 Id. at 179 (footnotes omitted). The court also maintained that "in Floridan the
wearing of the buttons was a part of the 'Union's campaign to increase its membership' and
the company rule was not announced until after the wearing of the union buttons had
begun.... Floridan is clearly distinguishable from this case." Id.
49 29 U.S.C. § 157 (emphasis added).
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such occurrences and avoid them if they wish to remain in business.
This is a valid exercise of business judgment, and it is not the
province of the Board or of this court to substitute its judgment
for that of management so long as the exercise is reasonable and
does not interfere with a protected purpose."
Again, however, the court's reasoning was too shallow. First,
the court failed to explain how the union insignia detracted from
the professional appearance of its employees. The implicit corollary
to the court's argument is that there is something unprofessional
about an employee's quiet expression of union solidarity. Yet, the
court offered no support for such a harsh, anti-labor assumption.
Furthermore, it simply is irrelevant that the employer also forbade
the wearing of jewelry and other emblems, for they were not related
to the workers' statutorily protected right to signify loyalty to their
union. Finally, the court's conclusion that union insignia may be
prohibited before even a single patron complains subordinates work-
ers' rights to an employer's unilateral, unsubstantiated speculation.
For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Harrah's Club rep-
resents an unjustifiable undermining of rights recognized and pro-
tected by the Act and Republic Aviation.51
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit followed Harrah's Club in Davi-
son-Paxon v. NLRB.5 2 In Davison-Paxon, a department store per-
mitted its salesclerks to wear tiny blue union buttons but objected
when they began wearing yellow buttons the size of a Kennedy half
dollar. The employer stated that such "gaudy" buttons violated its
dress code, which required employees to maintain a "businesslike
appearance," and could not be worn in areas frequented by custom-
ers.5 3 A salesclerk that persisted in wearing the yellow button on the
selling floor was then terminated.M
Harrah's Club, 337 F.2d at 180 (footnote omitted).
"The Board refused to follow Harrah's Club in Consolidated Casinos Corp., 164
N.L.R.B. 950 (1970), where it held that a casino operator violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act by
prohibiting workers from wearing union steward buttons. The Board distinguished Harrah's
Club because, in Consolidated, the union was attempting to organize the workers and the
employer had committed numerous unfair labor practices to prevent unionization. See Con-
solidated, 164 N.L.R.B. at 950-51. The Board also emphasized, however, that "there was no
substantial evidence that [the buttons] affected Respondent's business or that the prohibition
against wearing them was necessary to maintain employee discipline." Id. at 950. This approach
is preferable to the Ninth Circuit's unthinking acceptance of the employer's self-serving
assertion of a business justification.
462 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1972), denying enforcement to 191 N.L.R.B. 58 (1971).
" See Davis-Paxon Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 58, 58-59 (1971), enforcement denied, 462 F.2d
364 (5th Cir. 1972).
', See id. at 59-60.
1991-92]
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In an opinion adopted by the Board, the trial examiner held
that the employer's actions violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of
the Act. Tie trial examiner reasoned that the employer could not
ban the buttons from the selling floor based on the speculation that
they might offend customers.5 5 He further found that the buttons
had not caused undue tension among employees and concluded that
there was "no business, efficiency, or controversial reason here to
curtail the general right of salespeople to wear union campaign
buttons ... even on the selling floor. 5 6
The Fifth Circuits7 refused to enforce the Board's order for a
series of unpersuasive reasons. First, the court emphasized that the
employer's dress code forbade items "which are unfashionable or
in bad taste" and had been applied to other articles such as culottes
and miniskirts.5 As in Harrah's Club, however, such reasoning is
intellectually anemic. As an initial matter, it reveals the court's
perception that union buttons are inherently unrespectable or un-
businesslike. Furthermore, it is irrelevant that the dress code covered
miniskirts and other matters of sartorial taste because such items do
not involve organizational rights protected by the Act. It is one
thing to forbid employees from wearing "gaudy" clothing; it is quite
different to prohibit them from engaging in statutorily protected
organizational activity simply because one does not like the size and
color of their buttons. The court's blindness to this critical difference
leaves employees at the mercy of an employer's subjective judgment
of what is d6class6 and trivializes the workers' need for expression.
The court also reasoned that the employer "was concerned
primarily with the button's capacity to antagonize its customers"
and admonished the Board to recognize this "immediate and press-
15 See id. at 60-61.
5Id. at 61.
Davis-Paxon v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1972), denying enforcement to 191
N.L.R.B. 58 (1971).
Id. at 368 & n.12. The court also noted that the yellow buttons were somewhat larger
than the insignia in Floridan and Consolidated Casinos. See id. at 368. As the trial examiner
had reasoned, however, "When general principles of labor law are determined by the eighth
or the quarter of an inch. . ., then it will be time for 'Bumble' to turn over in his grave and
repeat his famous observation, 'the law is a Ass."' Davis-Paxon Co., 191 N.L.R.B. at 61
(quoting CHAns DicKEms, OuvnR TwisT 335 (Kathleen Tillotson ed., Clarendon ed., Oxford
1982) (1846)). The court's testy response, that "it would be equally asinine... to ignore the
size of the button and its capacity for being noticed," Davis-Paxon, 462 F.2d at 368, does
nothing to blunt the trial examiner's point: Section 7 rights cannot be measured by a ruler.
Furthermore, the court seemed oblivious to the fact that a button's raison d'Etre is to be
noticed.
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ing concern to retail and service establishments. ' 59 Moreover, the
court asserted that an employer "should not be required to wait
until it receives complaints or suffers a decline in business to prove
special circumstances" that would justify prohibiting union insig-
nia.60
This argument, however, is too quick to make the dual assump-
tions that the buttons would alienate customers and that such alien-
ation would justify the prohibition. Neither assumption is necessarily
valid. The assumption that the store's patrons would be offended
by the buttons is unwarranted because customers, due to their own
union sympathies, are more likely to be pleased rather than offended
by the insignia.61 Indeed, the repeated insistence by employers and
courts that union insignia could destroy a company's public image
has little basis in reality. As polls reveal, far more Americans have
approved rather than disapproved of labor unions throughout the
history of the Act.62 In 1988, for example, sixty-one percent of
Americans polled approved of unions, compared to only twenty-five
percent that disapproved. 63 Furthermore, sixty-nine percent of those
polled agreed that "labor unions are good for the nation as a
whole," and eighty-one percent stated that workers should be free
to choose union representation. 6These findings controvert the fear
that the public would not frequent establishments that allow em-
ployees to wear union emblems.
Furthermore, the fact that some unspecified minority of custom-
ers might be offended by union buttons should not deprive workers
of their section 7 rights. For many years, the Board and courts have
emphasized that an employer's fear of losing customers is no excuse
for violating the Act.65 As Judge Learned Hand declared:
Davis-Paxon, 462 F.2d at 370 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 371 (quoting Harrah's Club, 337 F.2d at 180). For a discussion of Harrah's
Club, see supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
61 In 1972, when the Fifth Circuit decided Davison-Paxon, 59% of Americans polled
stated that they approved of labor unions whereas only 26% expressed disapproval. See
MicHAE. GoLDHEsx, TaE DECLmE op ORGANZmED LABoR IN TE UmNai STATES 35 (1987).
0 For a summary of public opinion polls taken from 1936 to 1985, see id. Even in
1981, when public support for unionism reached its nadir, 55% of Americans approved of
labor organizations compared to 35% that disapproved. See id. at 35.
"PAuL WEILER, GOvERNiNG TH WORKPLACE 106 n.3 (1990).
See id. at 299-300.
61 See, e.g., NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir.
1942) (holding that employer violated Act by discharging employee for his role in passing
resolution critical of the employer's stance in labor controversy), enforcing 33 N.L.R.B. 1170
(1941).
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[S]o long as the [concerted] "activity" is not unlawful, we can see
no justification for making it the occasion for a discharge; a union
may subsidize propaganda, distribute broadsides, support political
movements, and in any other way further its cause or that of
others whom it wishes to win to its side. Such activities may be
highly prejudicial to its employer; his customers may refuse to deal
with him, he may incur the enmity of many in the community
whose disfavor will bear hard upon him; but the [Act] forbids him
by a discharge to rid himself of those who lay such burdens upon
him. Congress has weighed the conflict of his interest with theirs,
and has pro tanto shorn him of his powers.66
The Davison-Paxon court next argued that there had been ten-
sion between pro-union and anti-union employees and that the em-
ployer reasonably feared "that the union conflict might erupt on
the sales floor if proper steps were not taken against use of the
yellow button." 67 That assertion, however, had been decisively re-
futed by the trial examiner. As the trial examiner had concluded,
the employer's fears of worker conflict "were not only speculative,
but, indeed, unwarranted in this case."' '
The court also emphasized that the case involved union campaign
buttons, which it asserted are inherently "more provocative" than
emblems that merely signify union membership.69 This assumption
"Peter Cailer, 130 F.2d at 506 (emphasis added).
Peter Caller must be distinguished from instances when employees disparage the quality
of their employer's product in a manner that bears no discernible relation to a pending labor
controversy. In NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, 346 U.S. 464 (1953), for example, technicians
publicly attacked the quality of their employer's broadcasting in handbills that made no
reference to their union, collective bargaining, or their labor dispute with the employer. Under
these circumstances, the Supreme Court ruled that the employer's discharge of those employees
was not violative of the Act. See id. at 476-78. Such misconduct, of course, bears no relation
to the peaceful wearing of union symbols that do not disparage the employer or its products.
Furthermore, it bears emphasis that Judge Hand's statement remains good law and has been
quoted with approval in more recent Board and judicial opinions. See, e.g., Kaiser Eng'rs v.
NLRB, 538 F.2d 1379, 1385 n.4 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that employer violated Act by
retaliating against employees that lobbied Congress), enforcing 213 N.L.R.B. 752 (1974);
Hennepin Broadcasting Assocs., 225 N.L.R.B. 486, 506 (1976) (holding that strikers' appeals
to customers not to patronize employer during labor dispute were protected by § 7), enforced,
96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2585 (8th Cir. 1977).
6Davison-Paxon, 462 F.2d at 369.
6DavisonPaxon, 191 N.L.R.B. at 61. For a discussion of fear of employee conflicts
as a justification for prohibiting union insignia, see infra notes 134-199 and accompanying
text.
"See Davison-Paxon, 462 F.2d at 369.
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seems counterintuitive ° and would deprive workers of the right to
wear insignia when it arguably is most crucial, when a union organ-
ization drive is underway and employees are appealing to their co-
workers to make common cause. 71 In essence, the Fifth Circuit in
Davison-Paxon made the converse error of the Ninth Circuit in
Harrah's Club. Whereas the Ninth Circuit blundered by assuming
that employees are entitled to wear union insignia only for a specific
purpose, such as to organize co-workers, the Fifth Circuit erred by
suggesting that workers enjoy less protection when the insignia are
for such a purpose. Both perspectives are incomplete, for they
underestimate the breadth of section 7's protection and the need of
workers to demonstrate union solidarity both in times of challenge
and in times of relative calm. Although the Fifth Circuit purported
"to maintain a proper balance between conflicting interests of man-
agement and labor,"' it tipped the scales by according great weight
to the employer's conjectural fears and virtually none at all to the
workers' organizational rights.
The Sixth Circuit's 1984 decision, Burger King Corp. v. NLRB,73
displays similar insensitivity to workers' rights. In Burger King, the
management of a fast-food restaurant forbade employees from wear-
ing union buttons.74 The Board held that this violated section 8(a)(1)
of the Act, stating:
It is well settled that, in the absence of special circumstances,
an employee's wearing a union button at work is protected activity
under Section 7 of the Act. Respondent argues ... that [the
employee's] contact with customers constituted such a special cir-
cumstance, reasoning that Respondent seeks to project a neat,
standard appearance by its employees and is therefore justified in
,0 Even assuming arguendo that some of the store's customers were hostile to unions,
it would seem that they would be more provoked by union membership buttons, which signify
that employees are in fact represented by a labor organization, than by union campaign
buttons, which merely reflect the aspiration of individual wearers to be unionized.
7' As the Board has stated, "The right of workers to organize freely for the purpose of
collective bargaining is a very strong Section 7 right, one found by the Supreme Court to be
'at the very core of the purpose for which the [Act] was enacted."' New Process Co., 290
N.L.R.B. No. 83, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,520 (July 29, 1988) (footnote omitted)
(ordering employer to cease and desist from wiping dirt or grease on union insignia worn by
employees) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180, 206 n.42 (1978)), enforced without opinion, 872 F.2d 413 (3d Cir. 1989).
Davison-Paxon, 462 F.2d at 372.
,1 725 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1984), denying enforcement in relevant part to 265 N.L.R.B.
1507 (1982).
7 See- Burger King Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1053, 1053 (6th Cir. 1984), denying
enforcement in relevant part to 265 N.L.R.B. 1507 (1982).
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prohibiting employees with substantial customer contact from wear-
ing union buttons. However, "mere contact with customers is not
a basis for barring the wearing of union buttons," and absent
"substantial evidence that the button affected Respondent's busi-
ness or that the prohibition was necessary to maintain employee
discipline," requiring the removal of such a small, nonprovocative
button is unlawful. Respondent here has shown nothing more than
that [the employee] had customer contact. This does not, in and
of itself, constitute a "special circumstance" and does not justify
prohibiting employees with customer contact from wearing such a
union button.75
Although the Board reached a just result, its reasoning was too
limited. By emphasizing that the button was "small" and "non-
provocative" (one and one-half inches in diameter), it left open the
issue of when insignia would be considered so large or inciting as
to be validly banned.7 6 Such a vague limitation offers little protection
to workers and invites future litigation.
Even this limited protection was disapproved by the Sixth Cir-
cuit, however, which refused to enforce this aspect of the Board's
decision. The court emphasized that the restaurant required all em-
ployees to wear uniforms and, with occasional lapses, had enforced
a rule that "only company approved name tags, buttons and alter-
ations in uniforms are allowed." ' The court then concluded:
Here Burger King has attempted to project a clean, profes-
sional image to the public. It has consistently enforced its policy
against wearing unauthorized buttons in a nondiscriminatory man-
ner. It is a national fast food chain deriving much of its recognition
from its uniform public image. It is not asserted that this policy
had its inception because of labor unions or union activities. There
are special circumstances which justify this prohibition. 78
The court proceeded to promulgate a per se rule that "where
an employer enforces a policy that its employees may only wear
11 Burger King Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. 1507, 1507-08 (1982) (citations omitted), enforce-
ment denied in relevant part, 725 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1984).
76 The Board's distinction of its prior decisions in United Parcel Serv., 195 N.L.R.B.
441 (1972), discussed infra at notes 93-102 and accompanying text, and Great Western Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 256 N.L.R.B. 520 (1981), discussed infra at note 110, was also unsatisfac-
tory. The Board simply argued that in those cases the employees could at least wear "small
unprovocative union buttons," whereas, in the case at bar, the employer had prohibited the
wearing of similarly sized insignia. See Burger King, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1508 n.4.
Burger King, 725 F.2d at 1055.
7 Id.
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authorized uniforms in a consistent and nondiscriminatory fashion
and where those employees have contact with the public, a 'special
circumstance' exists as a matter of law which justifies the banning
of union buttons." 9
This approach is unjustifiable. First, as Judge Merritt noted in
his partial dissent, "There [was] no evidence in the record indicating
even the possibility that customers might complain about such but-
tons or that these buttons damaged the employees' image more than
the few [non-union] buttons sanctioned by the employer."8 0 Indeed,
it borders on the facetious to suggest that Burger King's "image"
could be devalued by the presence of union insignia. The court's
emphasis that Burger King employees wear uniforms is also mis-
guided, for that should not defeat a worker's right to signify union
sympathies. Finally, the court's per se rule, that union buttons may
be forbidden if employees wear uniforms and have contact with the
public, gives extreme and unjustifiable weight to the dual assump-
tions that customers would be alienated by the presence of union
insignia and that this would necessarily justify such a prohibition."'
- Id. The Sixth Circuit recently reaffirmed its Burger King rule in Hertz Corp. v. NLRB,
136 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2064 (6th Cir. 1990) (per curiarm), remanding 297 N.L.R.B. No. 54,
1989-90 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 15,905 (Nov. 21, 1989), acq. in result, 305 N.L.R.B. No. 47
(Oct. 21, 1991). In sharp contrast to the Sixth Circuit, the Board, in Glenlynn, Inc., 204
N.L.R.B. 299 (1973), held that the operator of a McDonald's drive-in restaurant violated the
Act by insisting that an employee remove his union button.
Burger King, 725 F.2d at 1056 (Merritt, J., concurring and dissenting).
"The Sixth Circuit also reversed the Board in Borman's, Inc. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 1138
(6th Cir. 1982), denying enforcement to 254 N.L.R.B. 1023 (1981). In Borman's, the Board
found that the employer violated § 8(a)(1) by forbidding employees from wearing a T-shirt
bearing a union inscription and the statement: "I'm tired of bustin' my ass." See Borman's
Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. 1023, 1023-25 (1981), enforcement denied, 676 F.2d 1138 (6th Cir. 1982).
The Sixth Circuit refused to enforce that order, stating that the employer's conduct was
"isolated" and that wearing the T-shirt was not protected by the Act. See Borman's, 676
F.2d at 1139. The court offered no analysis or citations to support these cryptic conclusions.
The T-shirt in Borman's is materially different from the union emblems discussed throughout
this Article, however, because it contained language that could be construed as profane rather
than just pro-union. See also Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 200 N.L.R.B. 667 (1972) (upholding
employer's ban on sweatshirts stating "Ma Bell is a Cheap Mother"). For further commentary
regarding the regulation of profanity in the workplace, see James Atleson, Obscenities in the
Workplace: A Comment on Fair and Foul Expression and Status Relationships, 34 Burr. L.
REv. 693 (1985); Ken Jennings, Verbal and Physical Abuse Toward Supervision, 29 ARB. J.
258 (1974).
Although not involving union insignia, and therefore beyond the scope of this Article,
Midstate Tel. Corp. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1983), denying enforcement in relevant
part to 262 N.L.R.B. 1291 (1982), further exemplifies the eagerness of some appellate tribunals
to override the Board's determinations. In Midstate, employees returning to work after a
prolonged strike wore T-shirts featuring a cracked facsimile of the employer's trademark and
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Even when appellate courts protect the right to wear union
insignia, they usually do so in a vague and unsatisfactory manner.
In the Ninth Circuit's 1981 Pay 'N Save Corp. v. NLRBs2 decision,
for example, the court affirmed the Board's conclusion that a drug
store operator violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) by discharging
two sales clerks that had worn union buttons on the selling floor."3
The court soundly rejected the employer's argument that it had
acted to avoid offending customers, but its efforts to distinguish its
previous decision in Harrah's Club were weak and troublesome. The
court first emphasized that the wearing of insignia in Pay 'N Save
was part of a union's organizational efforts whereas no such purpose
existed in Harrah's Club. 4 The court then reasoned:
In our case the employee interest [in wearing insignia] is much
stronger [than in Harrah's Club] since an organizing drive was
under way, and the employer's interest in employee appearance is
much weaker, since Pay 'N Save's clerks in their bright orange
smocks have little in common with the service personnel of a
casino/restaurant "on a par with... the finest theatre-restaurants
in the world." '83
Similarly, the court attempted to distinguish the Fifth Circuit's
opinion in Davison-Paxon by noting the existence of tension between
pro-union and anti-union employees in that case. Furthermore, Dav-
ison-Paxon "involved a fashionable department store that liked its
the words, "I survived the Midstate Strike of 1971-1975-1979." Midstate Tel. Corp., 262
N.L.R.B. 1291, 1291 (1982), enforcement denied in relevant part, 706 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1983).
The Board determined that the employer's prohibition of these shirts violated the Act,
emphasizing that the shirts "were clearly directed at promoting ... solidarity" in the strike's
aftermath and that there was no evidence that they would "tend to impair discipline, safety,
or production." Id. at 1291-92.
The Second Circuit disagreed with the Board, arguing that the shirts could irritate
relations between management and the workers and "might "improperly suggest to the public
that the Company was in some way coming apart." Midstate, 706 F.2d at 404. Each of these
rationales is rather weak. First, it is doubtful that the rather innocuous T-shirt would either
engender or worsen any animosity between employees and management. The hypothetical
hypersensitivity of some management personnel is hardly adequate cause to stifle the workers'
quest for solidarity. Second, the Board specifically noted that most of the workers wearing
the shirts did not have regular working contact with the public. Midstate, 262 N.L.R.B. at
1291. Finally, it seems rather fanciful to assume that the public would misconstrue the shirts
as evidence that the corporate employer was on the verge of collapse.
22 641 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1981), enforcing 247 N.L.R.B. 1346 (1980).
13 See Pay 'N Save Corp. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1981), enforcing 247
N.L.R.B. 1346 (1980).
" See Pay 'N Save, 641 F.2d at 700-01.
Id. at 701 n.10 (quoting Harrah's Club, 337 F.2d at 178 n.1).
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employees to double as customers and models for its merchandise. ' '86
Finally, the Ninth Circuit distinguished both Harrah's Club and
Davison-Paxon by observing that the drug store in Pay 'N Save had
permitted employees to wear other "potentially controversial" but-
tons while on duty.87
Such distinctions, unfortunately, do little to clarify when em-
ployees may safely wear union insignia. First, as explained earlier,88
it is misguided to hold that employees lose the right to wear union
insignia unless they have an immediate goal in mind such as obtain-
ing Board certification. Furthermore, drawing distinctions among
drug stores, casinos, and department stores is arbitrary. The Pay 'N
Save court's rationale appears to be that union buttons may be
acceptable in menial work settings but not when the workplace is
more exclusive or the clientele more wealthy or sophisticated. As
such, the court's reasoning repeats the unjustifiable assumption that
there is something d6class6 or undignified about union insignia. Such
an analysis inevitably implies that the workers' expression of union
support is less important than an employer's desire for a sterile,
bourgeois atmosphere. Finally, the Pay 'N Save court emphasized
that the drug store had disparately applied its rule against insignia,
but it failed to clarify which result it would have reached had the
rule been applied in a nondiscriminatory manner.
The weakness of the Ninth Circuit's approach is further exem-
plified by NLRB v. Rooney, 9 a 1982 decision. In Rooney, the Board
decided that a restaurant had discriminated against a waitress by
laying her off for wearing a union button. The Board ordered the
restaurant to cease and desist from "[d]emanding that employees
remove union buttons and sending them home from work because
they refuse to do so."' 9 The Ninth Circuit agreed that the restaurant
had acted unlawfully, but held that the Board's order was overly
broad because it would have prohibited any anti-button policy.91
Relying upon Harrah's Club, the court stated that "legitimate con-
cern over the appearance of employees providing direct service to
the public may justify restrictions on the right to wear buttons,"
Id. at 701.
See id.
See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
"677 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1982), modifying and remanding 247 N.L.R.B. 1004 (1980).
90 Rooney, 247 N.L.R.B. 1004, 1004 n.2, 1013-15 (1980), modified and remanded, 677
F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1982).
"1 See NLRB v. Rooney, 677 F.2d 44, 46-47 (9th Cir. 1982), modified and remanded,
247 N.L.R.B. 1004 (1980).
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and concluded that "a business such as the restaurant involved here,
that caters to theatre patrons, may place reasonable restrictions on
the type of buttons worn, as long as such restrictions are not applied
discriminatorily and do not unreasonably bar the wearing of appro-
priate union insignia."' 2
Such reasoning is a study in vagueness. The court failed to
explain why a restaurant serving theater patrons is materially differ-
ent from a drug store, as in Pay 'N Save, or what constitutes
appropriate union insignia. This cloudy analysis can only lead to
further litigation. Even worse, such reasoning deters employees from
wearing union emblems because they cannot predict with confidence
when courts will protect their right to do so.
2. The Board's Internal Inconsistency
Although the appellate courts have played the primary role in
limiting the right to wear union insignia, the Board itself must also
bear part of the responsibility. In its 1972 United Parcel Services,
Inc.9 opinion, for example, the Board bowed to an employer's
alleged need to protect its public image. In United Parcel, the
employer required delivery truck drivers to be uniformed neatly and
enforced a rule providing that "[v]isible garments which are not
part of the uniform are never worn with it." 94 The only emblems
permitted were small buttons signifying that workers had paid their
union dues or had been recognized for safe driving.91
Controversy arose when one of the drivers, who sought to be
elected union business agent, distributed campaign pins. Numerous
employees began wearing them and the employer responded by
posting a notice reminding employees of the rule against unauthor-
ized accessories.9 Twenty drivers were discharged for continuing to
wear buttons. An arbitrator ordered reinstatement of the fired work-
ers, however, and they later filed charges with the Board.Y
The trial examiner held that the wearing of these buttons was
"protected under Section 7 of the Act in that the employees have
as much interest in who represents them in their affairs with the
employer as they have in fixing the terms of their collective-bargain-
92 Id. at 47.
- 195 N.L.R.B. 441 (1972).
' Id. at 443.
See id.
9See id. at 443-44.
"See id. at 444-45.
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ing agreement." 98 He then held that the employer's notice "TO ALL
EMPLOYEES" violated the Act because it banned all workers,
including those that had no contact with the public, from wearing
campaign buttons.99
The Board overruled this determination on the ground that the
prohibition, despite its wording, was applied only to drivers "when
they were exposed to customers and the general public."'' 1 The
Board accepted, however, the trial examiner's reasoning that such a
limited ban would be lawful. The trial examiner asserted that the
drivers' appearance was essential to the employer's public image and
that the employer should not be forced to wait until receiving
complaints or losing customers to prohibit the buttons. 101 Finally,
the trial examiner concluded:
As a practical matter, the driver on the route is giving up very
little in not wearing the button. His union affiliation and union
activities are made known to the public by wearing his union dues
button. The public, at large, is little, or not at all, interested in
the competition for the post of business agent that recurs internally
to Local 294. The purpose of the button is to induce other members
of Local 294 to vote for [the candidate]. This purpose may be
achieved at the plant or in places where other members of Local
294 are present. The probabilities are very small that this purpose
will be achieved were the button worn by the driver on his route.
The record contains no evidence on this subject. Nevertheless, it is
not unreasonable to find that the number of Local 294 members
that a UPS driver meets on the delivery route is negligible. Thus,
in balancing conflicting rights ... , the restriction posted here
"Id. at 448 (footnote omitted) (citing Aerodex, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 192, 198 (1964);
General Aniline & Film Corp., 145 N.L.R.B. 1215, 1218 (1964)). The Board found it unnec-
essary to review this aspect of the trial examiner's decision, see id. at 441 n.3, but his
conclusion was plainly correct. As the Sixth Circuit explained in General Motors Corp. v.
NLRB, 512 F.2d 447, 448 (6th Cir. 1975), enforcing as modified 212 N.L.R.B. 133 (1974)
and 211 N.L.R.B. 986 (1974):
[Tihe election of officers has a significant bearing on the character of the
union and hence contributes to the selection or rejection of the union as the
employees' bargaining representative. Consequently, we agree with the Board
that a ban on the distribution of literature pertaining to the candidacy of
individuals for union office is invalid ....
- United Parcel, 195 N.L.R.B. at 448.
1w Id. at 441.
1*1 See id. at 450. The trial examiner also argued that the campaign buttons, which were
two and one-half inches in diameter, were "conspicuous," whereas the union dues buttons,
which were less than an inch in diameter, were not. See id. at 443-44, 450. He failed, however,
to explain at what point a button becomes "conspicuous" and thus validly objectionable.
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deprives the employee of something of small value in relation to
the potential damage to UPS. 1°2
Such reasoning is hollow and disturbing. First, the trial examiner
fell into the Harrah's Club error of permitting the employer to
enjoin union buttons based on the mere surmise that they could
tarnish its public image. This assumption was unsupported by any
evidence and is internally inconsistent with the examiner's assump-
tion that the public had little or no interest in the campaign for
union business agent. Given that people would already be apprised
of the drivers' union membership, because of their union dues
buttons, and presumably would have no interest in the intra-union
campaign, they would not be offended by the buttons. Simply put,
no "special circumstances" existed to justify the employer's prohi-
bition.
The trial examiner's belief that the drivers derived little benefit
from wearing the buttons is equally groundless. Obviously the driv-
ers, who were in the best position to know, believed that wearing
the buttons was useful. Otherwise they would not have risked their
jobs by continuing to do so. Moreover, the trial examiner admitted
that no evidence was presented regarding whether or not drivers saw
one another on their routes, such as by meeting for lunch or on
breaks. The examiner, therefore, had no objective basis for his
conclusion that the workers' right to wear the buttons was out-
weighed by the employer's concern for its public image.
Despite these weaknesses, the Board soon relied on United Parcel
later in 1972. In Evergreen Nursing Home & Rehabilitation Center,03
a nursing home forbade employees from wearing any insignia except
for nametags and pins related to nursing service."°4 When the em-
ployees began wearing union campaign buttons, the employer or-
dered removal of the emblems. In an opinion adopted by the Board,
the trial examiner held that this did not violate the Act.1°5
The trial examiner rested his decision on two grounds. First, he
emphasized that the employees worked with "confused and disori-
ented" patients whose "reactions to outside stimuli of any sort are
unpredictable and could cause severe agitation, upsetting Respon-
dent's operations and control." 106 Second, he found that the buttons
'0 Id. at 450.
"0 198 N.L.R.B. 775 (1972).
"0 See Evergreen Nursing Home & Rehabilitation Center, 198 N.L.R.B. 775 (1972).
10, See id. at 778-79.
106 Id. at 779.
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"detract[ed] from the dignity of the all-white uniform worn by the
employees," and that "[t]he neat and professional appearance of
the nurses is an important part of Respondent's image both to its
patients and the public." 10 He therefore concluded: "[Tihe 'special
circumstances' found herein justified Respondent's rule on dress,
implemented to ban the wearing of the union buttons used herein."'le
Nursing home residents must be treated with care and respect,
yet this does not justify the trial examiner's conclusions. In the
absence of actual complaints, the examiner was rash, and patron-izing, to assume that patients would be agitated by the buttons.109
Furthermore, the trial examiner's assertion that the buttons detracted
from the nurses' dignity and professional appearance reflects anti-
union bias rather than careful analysis. He failed to explain why the
expression of union support is necessarily undignified or unprofes-
sional. Finally, it is troubling that the Board adopted the trial
examiner's resolution of this issue without any substantive discus-
sion.110
Other Board decisions, however, demonstrate a higher regard
for workers' section 7 rights. Indeed, the most striking feature of
I07 Id.
106 Id.
109 The employer argued that one senile patient became upset by the buttons, but the
trial examiner stated that he was "not convinced of the occurrence of this isolated incident,"
and that even if it had occurred it would not have affected his disposition of the case. See
id. at 778.
11 The Board merely stated in a footnote that the trial examiner's conclusion was in
accord with the reasoning of United Parcel. See id. at 775 n.l; see also Great Western Coca
Cola, 256 N.L.R.B. 520 (holding that employer lawfully forbade employees from wearing
union insignia in areas visible to the public). In contrast to Evergreen, in Ohio Masonic Home,
205 N.L.R.B. 357 (1973), enforced, 511 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1975), the Board found that a
nursing home's enforcement of an anti-button rule violated the Act. The Board distinguished
Evergreen as follows:
In Evergreen, the employer had since its formation and prior to the union
organizing campaign enforced a rule prohibiting employees from wearing any
attachments to their clothing while at work except for name tags and pins
relating to nursing service. The union insignia in that case consisted of bright
yellow buttons 1-7/8 and 2-1/4 inches in diameter. The size and color of the
buttons obviously detracted from the all white uniforms worn by the employees.
In the present case, in contrast, the prohibition was against the wearing of union
insignia but not other attachments. It was not adopted until the onset of the
union organizing campaign, and the insignia was noticeably less conspicuous in
size and color than the union buttons in Evergreen. In all the circumstances, we
find that the prohibition against employees wearing union insignia at work was
promulgated not because of Respondent's concern with the health and welfare
of its residents, but to thwart the Union's organizational campaign.
Id. at 357; see also Holladay Park Hosp., 262 N.L.R.B. 278 (1982) (distinguishing Evergreen
based on employer's discriminatory enforcement of dress code).
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the Board's approach is its inconsistency. Despite United Parcel and
its progeny, other opinions have continued to shelter employees from
employer interference. As a consequence, the Board resembles "a
double-minded man, unstable in all his ways."'11
In Howard Johnson Motor Lodge,"2 for example, the Board
held that a motel's ban on union buttons violated section 8(a)(1) of
the Act."3 As the administrative law judge explained:
Respondent's argument that it was justified in proscribing
union button wearing by its employees because it feared that some
of its customers or potential customers might react adversely or
withhold their trade, is without merit. Respondent could as well
argue that it is for that reason permitted to operate, and publicize
that it operates, a "non-union motel." (Of course, it may con-
versely be conjectured that some of Respondent's potential custom-
ers might react favorably to employees wearing union buttons.)
The lawfulness of the exercise by employees of their rights under
the Act, including union button wearing, does not turn upon the
pleasure or displeasure of an employer's customers." 4
This analysis is commendable because it recognizes that the
specter of consumer disapproval must not extinguish the right to
wear union insignia. During the past decade, however, the Board's
protection of union insignia typically has been less absolute. In
Holladay Park Hospital,"5 for example, the Board explained:
[E]ven though a health care employer claims to be motivated
by a legitimate need to protect its patients from controversial issues,
the Board will not find such "special circumstances" justifying a
prohibition against wearing union insignia if the employer has
discriminatorily enforced its dress code to allow employees to wear
other types of buttons or attachments." 6
Albertsons, Inc. (Albertsons iI),"7 also emphasizes the need for
equal treatment of union and non-union adornments. As the ad-
'" James 1:8.
212 261 N.L.R.B. 866 (1982), enforced, 702 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1983).
"' See Howard Johnson Motor Lodge, 261 N.L.R.B. 866, 872 (1982), enforced, 702
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983).
4 Id. at 868 n.6; see also Sierra Dev. Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 22, 28 (1977) (stating that
"mere contact with customers is manifestly not a sufficient reason" for prohibiting union
insignia), enforced per curiam, 604 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1979).
"' 262 N.L.R.B. 278 (1982).
,16 Id. at 279.
"1 300 N.L.R.B. No. 142 (Dec. 21, 1990).
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ministrative law judge explained, "Restrictions against wearing of
any union emblem to further an employer's public image are occa-
sionally approved. However, such cases appear against a backdrop
of evidence showing that the employer strictly limits the wearing of
any other emblems by employees coming in contact with the pub-
lic." 1 1 8
This approach assures that union emblems are not singled out
for disadvantageous treatment. Such assurance is insufficient, how-
ever, because union emblems are entitled to more protection than
fraternity pins, bracelets, and other personal trinkets. Unlike these
latter items, the former pertain directly to rights enumerated in the
Act. For that reason, the right to wear union insignia should not
be predicated upon unequal wording or enforcement of a company's
dress code.
The Board also has emphasized that a ban on union insignia
must not be overly broad. In Albertsons, Inc. (Albertsons 1)119 the
Board stated:
[A]n employer may restrict the wearing of union emblems for
considerations such as production, discipline, or customer relations.
In this case, we conclude that the Respondent's restriction of
buttons is unlawfully broad because it applies to nonselling as well
as selling areas of the stores and applies to employee breaktime as
well as time when employees are working. Accordingly, we find
that the rule constitutes an unreasonable impediment to employee
union activity and a violation of section 8(a)(1).' 20
The significance of this declaration lies not in the protection
afforded but rather in the protection impliedly withheld. Albertsons
I clearly suggests that an employer may ban union insignia when
employees are working in areas visible to the public,121 yet the Board
"I Albertsons, Inc., 300 N.L.R.B. No. 142 (Dec. 21, 1990). Other recent cases also have
emphasized that dress codes must not discriminate against union insignia. See, e.g., Sears
Roebuck & Co., 300 N.L.R.B. No. 102 (Nov. 30, 1990); Uniontown Hosp. Ass'n, 277
N.L.R.B. 1298 (1985).
272 N.L.R.B. 865 (1984).
Albertsons, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 865, 866 (1984).
,2, As one administrative law judge has observed, Albertsons I "implies that the current
Board would find lawful a rule prohibiting the wearing of union insignia provided it permits
employees the right to wear such insignia in nonselling areas, and does not apply to employee
breaktimes when employees are not working." Kroger Co., 284 N.L.R.B. 663, 684 (1987)
(finding violation where rule applied to nonselling areas and nonworking time). In contrast,
another administrative law judge has asserted that Albertsons I "gives no hint that the Board
intended to depart from existing union emblems precedent." Albertsons II, 300 N.L.R.B. No.
142. This disagreement between the Board's own administrative law judges underscores the
sadly indeterminate nature of current doctrine.
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offered no explanation for this apparent shift in philosophy. The
1985 Brocal Corp."2 decision is to similar effect; After holding that
an ambulance service had unlawfully prohibited union buttons, the
Board ordered it to post the following notice to employees:
WE WILL NOT remove union buttons from your clothing,
forbid you to wear union buttons, or threaten to discharge you
for wearing union buttons; but we can restrict the wearing of union
buttons during working hours while employees have contact with
the public, if such a restriction is motivated by a legitimate non-
pretextual reason which does not involve any element of union
animus or discrimination between union insignia and other forms
of insignia.'2
Once again, the Board apparently would permit employers to
ban union insignia in many instances. However, no guidance is given
as to precisely when an employer's fears of consumer disgruntlement
would outweigh the employees' right to express union sympathies.
The Board therefore leaves both employers and workers uncertain
as to their legal rights and duties.
Yet another distinction drawn by the Board centers on the
dignity or conspicuousness of the emblem in question. In Nords-
trom, Inc.,'24 for example, the Board held that an employer unlaw-
fully prevented a sales clerk from wearing a small union steward
pin.'7 In an opinion approved by the Board, the administrative law
judge explained:
The controlling fact of this case is that the button at issue is small,
tasteful, and inconspicuous. The lack of an intrusive insignia...
is likely to reduce controversy among the clientele and to avoid
debasement of the fashionable image of the selling floor employ-
ees.... The instant steward pin is not of a size and intrusiveness
which unreasonably interferes with Respondent's operations, when
balanced against the recognized right to wear union insignia in the
absence of special considerations. 12
Similarly, in Hertz Corp.,'2 the Board emphasized that union stew-
ard pins were protected because they were "unobtrusive and con-
-- 276 N.L.R.B. 631 (1985).
12, Brocal Corp., 276 N.L.R.B. 631, 631 (1985).
264 N.L.R.B. 698 (1982).
12 See Nordstrom, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 698 (1982).
I Id. at 702. The same approach was taken in Albertsons II, where the administrative
law judge emphasized that the union emblems were protected because they were "subtle" and
"consumer passive." See Albertson II, 300 N.L.R.B. No. 142, at 8-9.
12 297 N.L.R.B. No. 54 (Nov. 21, 1989), remanded per curiam, 136 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2064 (6th Cir. 1990), acq. in result, 305 N.L.R.B. No. 47 (Oct. 21, 1991).
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vey[ed] no message beyond the mere identification of the wearers as
representatives of the Union."' n As one administrative law judge
has concluded:
It appears ... that an employer's concern for the image it
presents to the public may justify some limitation on employees'
wearing of union insignia if the employees to whom the prohibition
is directed have significant contact with the public and if (at least
in the Board's view) the insignia are conspicuous .... 129
This, of course, is precisely the problem: How does one deter-
mine whether a union emblem is so conspicuous or intrusive that it
loses the protection of section 7? Instead of safeguarding the right
of employees to signify their union allegiance, the Board appears to
be acting as an arbiter of fashion. The Board presents no principled
way to determine the applicability of section 7 based on the size,
color, or design of union insignia. Vague and subjective approaches
only discourage the wearing of union insignia because, under such
analyses, workers can never be certain when the Board will recognize
and protect their rights.
3. A Proposal to End the Conflict
Stated bluntly, employers should no longer be permitted to
prohibit union insignia by arguing that they could jeopardize cus-
tomer relations. First, there is nothing in Republic Aviation130 to
suggest that the Justices ever envisioned such a rationale. Although
the Court acknowledged that a ban on insignia could be justified
"to maintain production or discipline,' ' 13' it did not mention an
employer's conjectural fears of consumer alienation. Second, these
fears are conjectural. In no case has an employer demonstrated a
loss in business due to the wearing of union insignia by employees.
Third, the general public approval of unions32 indicates that far
more consumers would be pleased, rather than angered, by the sight
of union insignia. Fourth, even assuming that some consumers
2 Hertz Corp., 279 N.L.R.B. No. 54, at 1-2 (Nov. 21, 1989) (footnote omitted),
remanded per curiain, 136 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2064 (6th Cir. 1990).
129 Page Avjet Corp., 275 N.L.R.B. 773, 777 (1985) (finding ban on union insignia
unlawful because it applied to all employees regardless of whether they interacted with the
public).
2o For a discussion of Republic Aviation, see supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
2 Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 803-04 n.10.
232 See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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would be displeased by union insignia, that does not legitimate an
employer's interference with the workers' statutory rights.," Fifth,
the "customer relations" exception has engendered a tide of litiga-
tion as employers, unions, and workers are confronted with poorly
reasoned and conflicting opinions by the Board and courts of ap-
peals.
Rather than continue in this unprincipled and indeterminate vein,
the Board and courts should eliminate the "customer relations"
exception. Doing so would clarify the law, decrease litigation, and
treat section 7-and the American worker-with the respect they
deserve. Until this step is taken, the right to wear union insignia
will languish in a precarious state.
B. The Preservation of Workplace Discipline
Employers also have defended bans by alleging that union insig-
nia could incite arguments and violence in the workplace. Such
claims initially were greeted with skepticism, but employers have
invoked them successfully in a number of questionable circum-
stances. As in the "customer relations" cases, the Board and courts
have been too eager to accept employers' unilateral assertions and
negate the right to display union insignia.
1. Conflict Between the Board and Appellate Courts
As early as 1938, the Board rejected an employer's "discipline"
rationale. 134 In Armour & Co.," 5 a worker in a meatpacking house
was discharged for refusing to remove a union steward button. 136
The employer argued that its action had been necessary because
"the button was causing confusion and commotion in the plant and
... 'there was very likely to be trouble, friction, fights, and even
riots.'1137 The Board disagreed. Although "some confusion" had
been created by employee reactions to the insignia, the Board found
no basis "for the fear asserted by the respondent regarding a serious
disturbance in the plant.' '3 8
3 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
134 See Armour & Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 1100 (1938).
1' 8 N.L.R.B. 1100 (1938).
136 See id.
117 Id. at 1111.
I" Id. at 1l1 & n.5, 1112.
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In contrast, the Fifth Circuit condoned an employer's prohibition
in NLRB v. El Paso Electric Co. 39 In earlier proceedings, the court
had enforced a Board order requiring the employer, inter alia, to
cease and desist from interfering with its employees' section 7 rights. 40
The Board later petitioned to have the employer held in contempt,
in part for prohibiting its workers from wearing union insignia. 14'
The Fifth Circuit refused, stating:
The company has a rule of long standing which requires that
its employees do not display union insignia when on duty. We
surmise the purpose is to discourage union arguments and disputes
among the men on duty. In any case, it appears to have been
enforced without discrimination. We do not think the enforcement
of it since our decree is shown to have been intended to deny the
right of the employees to organize, or to violate the decree in any
manner.142
The court's reasoning is disturbing. A mere surmise by an ap-
pellate tribunal cannot justify depriving workers of their right to
display union insignia. Even if the court was correct in declining to
hold the employer in contempt, it carefully should have examined
the alleged interference with the employees' section 7 rights. Even
more regrettably, the El Paso decision foreshadowed unquestioning
use of the "discipline" rationale by subsequent tribunals.
The Ninth Circuit's Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB143 decision
shows this development. Following a bitter strike, subsequently found
unlawful, the union responsible for the work stoppage and a rival
union, unlawfully supported by the employer, began organizing
campaigns to compete for the workers' allegiance. 44 The Board held
that the employer violated the Act by prohibiting members of the
-- 133 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1943) (per curiam).
110 See El Paso Elec. Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 213 (1939), enforced as modified, 119 F.2d 581
(5th Cir. 1941).
"I See NLRB v. El Paso Elec. Co., 133 F.2d 168 (5thCir. 1943) (per curiam).
14 2d. (emphasis added).
1- 217 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1954), denying enforcement in relevant part to 103 N.L.R.B.
1025 (1953).
I" See Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 217 F.2d 369, 371-72, 377 (9th Cir. 1954), denying
enforcement in relevant part to 103 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1953). The strike had been found unlawful
because it violated both the sixty day "cooling off" requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) and a
no-strike provision in the collective bargaining agreement. See Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB,
174 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1949), denying enforcement to 80 N.L.R.B. 447 (1948). The employer's
assistance of the rival union violated 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2), which, in relevant part, provides
that it is unlawful for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or adminis-
tration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it."
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striking union from wearing their insignia.145 The Board denied that
the prohibition was needed to prevent friction between the rival
unions, stating:
[Tihe rules here in question were neither necessary to accom-
plish that objective nor reasonably related to that end. The Re-
spondent had adopted other rules, such as those prohibiting name
calling or derogatory remarks, which would accomplish the same
results.... As for the "I am loyal to 751 [the striking union]"
streamers, we find no reasonable basis in the record upon which
it can be said that they are any more inflammatory, or any more
likely to provoke clashes or other types of disorder, than any other
manifestation of union adherence, such as a membership button.'"
The Ninth Circuit refused to enforce this aspect of the Board's
decision. The court reasoned:
With such extremely inflammable materials as the passions of
the rival unions, the Teamsters and 751, the wearing of the strea-
mers and shop buttons must be viewed as the spark which might
in a second set everything afire again. No doctrine can give im-
munity to symbols and expressions which are incitements to crime
or violent action in breach of peace.... In the emergency, the
supervisors did discourage the wearing of these symbols for the
time, but there is no justification in the record for the conclusion
of the Board that there was a "rule" on either, or that the
prohibition lasted beyond the emergency.' 47
The court's analysis contains several flaws. First, it distorts the
facts to describe the rather innocuous buttons and streamers as
"incitements to crime or violent action."' 14 Second, the employer
did not report any violence between followers of the rival unions,
and, as the Board recognized, the employer's actions were unnec-
essary and inappropriate. Third, the court disingenuously suggested
that the employer had no rule against wearing the insignia even
though two employees were discharged or suspended for doing so. 49
,41 Boeing Airplane Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1026 (1953), enforcement denied in relevant
part, 217 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1954).
,,1 Id. at 1026-27. In accordance with this reasoning, the Board also found that the
employer had violated the Act by discharging an employee that refused to remove his union
committeeman button and suspending a co-worker that wore a loyalty streamer. See id. at
1027 & n.6.
'4' Boeing, 217 F.2d at 375.
' Id.
'1' See id. at 375. Even the court "reluctantly" accepted the Board's determination that
the employer had discriminated against the union committeeman that refused to remove his
button. See id. at 374.
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Fourth, an employer should not be able to lend unlawful assistance
to one of two competing unions and then seize upon the inter-union
rivalry as a pretext for banning the disfavored union's insignia.
Indeed, the court displayed a lack of impartiality by characterizing
the union insignia as dangerous and obnoxious while excusing the
employer's repeated violations of the law. 150
The Seventh Circuit's 1956 Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. NLRB151
decision also disregarded the Board's determinations. In Caterpillar,
the certified union distributed buttons proclaiming "DON'T BE A
SCAB!" and similar messages as part of its effort to increase
membership. 15 2 The employer did not object to the other messages
but asserted that the "scab" buttons were inflammatory and sus-
pended employees that continued wearing them.'53 The Board held
that these actions violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act.' 4
The Board reasoned:
It is to be expected that, in the heat of an organizational campaign,
union members may solicit the loyalties of fellow employees with
purpose and zeal, at times drawing upon the time-worn jargon of
trade unionism. When this Board is called upon to strike down
the statutory rights of employees embodied in Section 7 of the Act
because of the content of organizational slogans which appear on
campaign badges, the Board should do so only upon a clear
showing that special circumstances exist which justify such action
and that the interests to be thus served manifestly outweigh those
of the employees whose rights are thereby being withheld. On the
basis of the record before us, we do not believe that the Respon-
dent's fears and anxieties concerning the wearing of the "Scab"
button constitute, without more, such special circumstances as
would justify curtailment of rights statutorily guaranteed to the
Respondent's employees.'55
The Board's reasoning was clear and persuasive. It correctly
emphasized that the statutorily guarantied right to wear insignia
1 For example, the court displayed apparent bias by stating: "[I]t is remarkable that,
even if it were assumed that all the violations now found by the Board were to be accepted,
Boeing was able to keep the great organization from any more acts which the Board would
construe as violations." Id. at 377 (emphasis added).
1 230 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1956), denying enforcement to 113 N.L.R.B. 553 (1955).
2 See Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 553, 554 (1955), enforcement denied, 230
F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1956). The other buttons stated: "I'M PAYING MY WAY ARE YOU?,"
"DON'T BE A FREE RIDER!," and "I JOINED HAVE YOU?" Id.
w See id. at 554-55.
154 Id. at 555.
I" d. at 556.
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should not be defeated by an employer's speculative allegations-.
Indeed, that right would be meaningless if it could be ignored
whenever an employer raised fears of disruption. As the Board
explained:
The "Scab" button was worn for approximately 2 1/2 days
before its ban, and yet the record fails to disclose a single instance
in which the Respondent's production processes suffered interrup-
tion or the threat of interruption, nor does it indicate that so much
as a solitary murmur of resentment was heard from any employee
because of the display of that button. To permit the abridgement
of statutory rights on the basis of the anxieties expressed herein
by the Respondent, without the least scintilla of evidence that
production would be disrupted or breaches of discipline would
erupt, would be tantamount to administrative withdrawal of rights
legislatively endowed.5 6
The Seventh Circuit, however, refused to enforce the Board's
order. 57 The court asserted:
[Tihe protective mantle of Section 7 is tempered by the employer's
right to exact a day's work for a day's pay and to maintain
discipline, and does not reach activities which inherently carry with
them a* tendency toward, or likelihood of, disturbing efficient
operation of the employer's business. Perhaps no greater disruptive
force can be found in the field of labor relations than that innate
in the application of the term "scab" to one employee by his
fellow workman. The term, when applied to one embraced in a
labor group, bears an inescapable connotation of opprobiousness
and vileness commonly recognized by all members of modem
American society.'
The court then argued that the employer's "anticipation that the
'Scab' button would prove disruptive of employee harmony in its
plant and destructive of discipline in production was fully justified,"
and concluded that the employer "was under no compulsion to wait
until resentment piled up and the storm broke before it could
suppress the threat of disruption."'159
"' Id. at 557.
- Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. NLRB, 230 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1956), denying enforcement
to 113 N.L.R.B. 553 (1955).
"' Id. at 358-59.
Id. at 359 (emphasis added). The same approach was taken more recently in Virginia
Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1983), denying enforcement to 260
N.L.R.B. 408 (1982). In Virginia Electric, the Fourth Circuit overruled the Board and held
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Here the court stumbled into error. In light of the Board's
finding that the scab buttons had not caused the slightest tension
among workers, the employer's claims of potential disruption were
speculative and could not justify abridgement of the workers' section
7 rights.'16 Furthermore, as the Supreme Court later emphasized,
"[I]n a number of cases, the Board has concluded that epithets such
as 'scab,' 'unfair,' and 'liar' are commonplace in [labor] struggles
and not so indefensible as to remove them from the protection of
§ 7, even though the statements are erroneous and defame one of
the parties to the dispute."' 61 The Seventh Circuit's opinion was
therefore an unjustifiable interference with the Board's efforts to
protect the workers' rights.
Not all of the Board's efforts to protect union advocates have
met the same arbitrary fate as in Caterpillar. In fact, Kimble Glass
Co., 62 decided by the Board on the same day, was enforced by the
Sixth Circuit. In Kimble, members of an incumbent union warned
that the employer did not violate the Act by asking a receptionist to remove a large union
button. As the court concluded, "[T]he employer was not required to wait until a disturbance
actually occurs before taking reasonable steps to maintain employee discipline and efficiency."
Id. at 83.
'11 As a dissenting Board member observed, the relations between the employer and the
union "were exceptionally cordial and harmonious." Caterpillar, 113 N.L.R.B. at 560 (Rodg-
ers, dissenting). This history of peaceful cooperation diminished the risk of disruption or
violence in the workplace.
-' Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 60-61
(1966). Although the Linn Court held that a state court libel action for malicious defamation
was not preempted by the Act, the Justices emphasized that statements made in labor disputes
are ordinarily protected by the Act. See id. at 60-61. Furthermore, in Old Dominion Branch
No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974), the Court held that a
union's use of the term scab to describe workers that refused to become members was protected
speech under the federal labor laws and could not be the basis for a state law defamation
judgment. The Court stated:
Rather than being a reckless or knowing falsehood, naming the appellees as
scabs was literally and factually true. One of the generally accepted definitions
of "scab" is "one who refuses to join a union," and it is undisputed that the
appellees had in fact refused to join the Branch. To be sure, the word is most
often used as an insult or epithet. But Linn recognized that federal law gives a
union license to use intemperate, abusive, or insulting language without fear of
restraint or penalty if it believes such rhetoric to be an effective means to make
its point. Indeed, the Court observed that use of this particular epithet is common
parlance in labor disputes and has specifically been held to be entitled to the
protection of § 7 of the NLRA.
Id. at 283 (citation omitted). The same logic should have been applied in Caterpillar. "Scab"
is a recognized term for workers that refuse to join a union, and the court should not have
deprived the employees of their § 7 protection simply because the word might bruise a co-
worker's feelings.
10 113 N.L.R.B. 577 (1955), enforced per curiam, 230 F.2d 484 (6th Cir. 1956).
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that there could be violence and wildcat strikes'63 unless the employer
prohibited supporters of a rival union from wearing insignia.16 The
employer succumbed to this pressure, banned all union emblems,
and discharged twenty-one employees that refused to honor the
prohibition. 165
The Board spumed the employer's defense that the incumbent
union's threats constituted "special circumstances" and held that
the employer's actions violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the
Act. 1re The Board reasoned:
In our opinion, "special circumstances" require more than an
employer's submission to the demands of an incumbent union or
its members to prevent adherents of a rival union from exercising
their legitimate self-organizational rights. Indeed, it has long been
the settled law that an employer cannot excuse his interference
with employees' rights because of pressure exerted upon him by a
union. Yet, this appears to be precisely the case here. Instead of
taking appropriate measures against the employees who threatened
violence and a work stoppage, as would normally be expected, the
Respondent took the course of least resistance and adopted the no-
badge rule to the detriment of fellow employees seeking to exercise
their legitimate rights.'l
The Board's conclusion was correct. Section 7 rights must not
be extinguished by the pressure of employers or competing unions.
The Board was also correct in rejecting the employer's argument
that it could ban the buttons to preempt the possibility of conflict.
The Board conceded that "an employer may not be required to wait
for actual violence to occur in all circumstances," but explained that
the employer should have sought "to enjoin the abusive conduct"
instead of compelling employees to "abandon their statutory
rights." ' ,8 The Board found it "difficult to believe that the employer
could not have maintained complete order and efficiency by making
clear to employees that it would punish violation of rules against
- Wildcat strikes are work stoppages that either violate a collective bargaining agreement
or are unauthorized by the union. See generally ROBERT A. GoRMAN, BAsic TXr ON LABOR
LAW 307-11 & 604-20 (1976) (discussing wildcat strikes and the enforcement of no-strike
clauses).
'6 Kimble Glass Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 577, 593-94 (1955), enforced per curiam, 230 F.2d
484 (6th Cir. 1956).
I- See Kimble Glass, 113 N.L.R.B. at 578-80.
116 See id. at 583.
167 Id. at 579 (footnotes omitted).
' Id. at 581.
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disorder and interruption of production and by directing its mana-
gerial powers to that end rather than to banning union insignia." 169
The Sixth Circuit enforced the Board's order as "a reasonable
exercise" of the Board's powers.170 This decision was sound because
it would have been unprincipled to allow a third party's unlawful
threats to deprive employees of statutory rights. Regrettably, neither
the Board nor the Sixth Circuit persuasively addressed the conflict
between Kimble and Boeing.7' As Board member Rodgers empha-
sized in his Kimble dissent, the cases are factually analogous because
each involved inter-union rivalry and an alleged fear of violence and
disruption.' 2 The Board majority in Kimble downplayed this simi-
larity, noting that in Boeing the Ninth Circuit "found an incendiary
situation in the plant stemming from a history of violence and
intimidation during a recent illegal strike."' 7 This distinction con-
tradicts the Board's own reasoning in Boeing, however, and the
Board would have been more forthright if it explicitly had repudiated
the Ninth Circuit's approach. 7 4 In this manner, the Board could
have forcefully declared its commitment to protecting the workers'
section 7 rights. The Sixth Circuit also made no effort to reconcile
the two opinions, and simply cited Boeing without discussion. 75
11 Id. at 580-81.
170 Kimble Glass Co. v. NLRB, 230 F.2d 484, 485 (6th Cir. 1956) (per curiam), enforcing
113 N.L.R.B. 577 (1955).
' For a discussion of Boeing Airplane, see supra notes 143-150 and accompanying text.
See Kimble Glass, 113 N.L.R.B. at 586-87 (Rodgers, dissenting).
' Id. at 579 n.7.
'74 In numerous cases the Board has refused to follow the conflicting views of appellate
courts. See, e.g., Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768 (1957), enforcement denied,
260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958), aff'd, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). In Insurance Agents', the Board
stated:
It has been the Board's consistent policy for itself to determine whether to
acquiesce in the contrary views of a circuit court of appeals or whether, with
due deference to the court's opinion, to adhere to its previous holding until the
Supreme Court of the United States has ruled otherwise.
Id. at 773. This decision is quoted in Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence
by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 707 (1989). Estreicher and Revesz
acknowledge "the legitimacy of an agency's desire to maintain a uniform administration of
its governing statute while it reasonably seeks the national validation of its preferred position."
See id. at 771.
175 See Kimble Glass, 230 F.2d at 485. An appellate court also supported the Board's
approach in Singer Co. v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1973), enforcing 199 N.L.R.B.
1195 (1972). In Singer, the Tenth Circuit accepted the Board's conclusion that fears of
"interfactional hostilities" and a decrease in production did not justify the employer's prohi-
bition of union insignia. See id. at 270-71.
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2. The Board's Internal Inconsistency
The law in this area is further complicated by the Board's failure
to speak in a clear and consistent manner. In United Aircraft
Corp. ,176 for example, the Board accepted the employer's justifica-
tion for banning union insignia. 1' In this case, there was a lengthy
economic dispute in which only some 4,500 of approximately 16,000
employees remained on strike until a settlement was reached. The
union sold special loyalty pins to employees that had honored the
strike throughout the conflict. About 615 pins were sold and ap-
proximately forty-three employees wore them to work. 178
The employer demanded the removal of these pins, arguing that
they could interfere with discipline and production by deepening
animosities between loyal strikers and those that had crossed the
picket line. 179 The trial examiner held that the employer had trans-
gressed the Act, 1' ° but he was overruled by the Board. Because of
continuing violence and threats against nonstrikers, the Board con-
cluded that the prohibition was "a reasonable precautionary measure
under the circumstances.' 8
United Aircraft is a difficult case. The tension in the plant was
undeniable; certain union loyalists had vowed that "every strike-
breaker will be hunted down," and "the cry 'scabbie' will ring loud
and clear" and "follow some employees to their graves."''  More-
over, there were two reported instances of fighting, and three in-
volving name-calling between strikers and nonstrikers following the
settlement.8 3 Such actions are regrettable, and one can certainly
sympathize with the employer's desire for a peaceful and productive
working environment.
Nonetheless, the Board exaggerated the extent of such problems
and unjustifiably overrode the workers' section 7 rights. The threats
and fighting involved only a few workers in a plant with approxi-
mately 16,000 employees.' 4 Indeed, only forty-three employees, less
than one percent of the work force, wore the loyalty pins, and the
176 134 N.L.R.B. 1632 (1961).
'77 United Aircraft Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 1632 (1961).
' See id. at 1633, 1636.
See id. at 1633, 1638. The employer did not, however, ban the wearing of other union
insignia. See id. at 1634 n.4.
' See id. at 1639-40.
See id. at 1633-35.
18 See id. at 1634.
"I See id. at 1635 n.6.
IN See id. at 1637.
[VOL. 80
UNON INSIGNIA
Board did not indicate a single instance where the pins themselves
incited disobedience or undermined production. Moreover, the union
loyalists' threats rang hollow given that the overwhelming majority
of workers had crossed the picket line. Furthermore, the employer
could have maintained order by discharging those employees that
threatened co-workers or disrupted production. 5 As the Board rec-
ognized in Kimble, the employer should have disciplined the actual
instigators of violence instead of forbidding all employees from
peacefully wearing loyalty pins. In fact, the union itself could have
been prosecuted under section 8(b)(l)(A)ls6 of the Act if it unlawfully
coerced any workers. Finally, the Board naively assumed that pro-
hibiting the loyalty pins would alleviate tensions. Bitterness ingrained
over the course of a lengthy strike may not disappear with the
compelled removal of union buttons. If anything, depriving the loyal
strikers of a peaceful means of expression might harden their re-
sentment and rekindle thoughts of retaliation.
Unfortunately, the United Aircraft decision ignored the strikers'
interest in wearing their pins. These workers had endured weeks
without pay, risked being permanently replaced,187 and suffered the
demoralization of seeing thousands of co-workers cross the picket
line. In return for their sacrifices, the union could offer only loyalty
pins. Such recognition, small as it may seem, could help restore the
strikers' self-esteem and enhance the union's ability to preserve
group solidarity in the event of future disputes. These aims are in
keeping with the spirit of section 7 and should not be crushed
because of isolated threats and misconduct.
"I Employers clearly may discharge employees that assault or batter their co-workers. As
one court explained, "All who 'gang up' or participate with others in assaulting and illegally
intimidating a non-striking employee to prevent him from pursuing lawful gainful employment
become particeps criminis and aiders and abettors and 'forfeito] any right they may have had
to reinstatement as employees."' Trailmobile Div., Pullman Inc. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1006,
1018 n.7 (5th Cir. 1969) (quoting NLRB v. Longview Furniture Co., 206 F.2d 274, 277 (4th
Cir. 1953)); see also Titan Metal Mfg. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 196, 206 (1962) (explaining that
"conduct calculated to put a nonstriker in fear of bodily harm is sufficient to justify the
employer in denying the status of employee to the misbehaving striker").
I 29 U.S.C. § 158(bXlXA) (prohibiting unions and their agents from restraining or
coercing employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights).
'0 As the Supreme Court stated in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333
(1938), an employer may hire permanent replacements to fill the positions of economic strikers.
The Court explained that it is not "an unfair labor practice to replace the striking employees
with others in an effort to carry on the business," and an employer "is not bound to discharge
those hired to fill the places of strikers, upon the election of the latter to resume their
employment, in order to create places for them." Id. at 345-46 (footnote omitted). For cogent
criticism of the Mackay Radio doctrine, see W nua, supra note 63, at 264-69.
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The Board's 1989 decision in Reynolds Electrical & Engineering
Co. 1 8 reflects the continuing vitality of United Aircraft. In Reynolds,
after a strike marked by violence, many employees wore buttons
with a red diagonal line slashed through the word scab.18 When
violence and harassment against the nonstrikers continued, the em-
ployer prohibited the wearing of that button. 190 The Board upheld
the ban, stating:
In this case, there were numerous hostile acts by strikers against
nonstrikers during and continuing after the strike. These acts in-
cluded verbal abuse, vandalizing automobiles, the firing of shots
into a home, threats of personal injury, and threats to drive
nonstrikers from their jobs. On the other hand, there is no evidence
that the Respondent bore any animosity towards the strikers. Dur-
ing the strike, it did not hire replacements. When the strike ended,
the Respondent reemployed all returning strikers, and it had con-
cluded new bargaining agreements with most of the unions repre-
senting its employees. Most importantly, both before and after the
strike, the Respondent undisputably permitted the wearing of all
other types of union insignia. Under these particular circumstances,
... we find, based on United Aircraft Corp., that the Respon-
dent's prohibition against wearing the buttons in the plant was "a
reasonable precautionary measure" and hence did not violate Sec.
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 19'
The misconduct of certain strikers was both brutal and gro-
tesque. 92 Nonetheless, the case was wrongly decided. The employer's
proper remedy for the abuses was to terminate the actual wrongdoers
and pursue criminal and tort actions against the most egregious
offenders, not to ban the buttons. The overwhelming majority of
workers wearing anti-scab buttons may never have engaged in abu-
sive acts. 193 Instead of limiting the section 7 rights of all strikers,
the Board should have insisted that the employer concentrate its
energies on identifying and disciplining the actual perpetrators of
misconduct.
1- 292 N.L.R.B. 947 (1989).
11 See Reynolds Elec. & Eng'g Co., 292 N.L.R.B. 947, 949 (1989).
o See id. at 949.
Id. at 947 n.1 (citation omitted).
292 See id. at 948, 949 (noting that strikers allegedly had urinated on a nonstriker's lunch).
See id. at 950. Numerous workers testified that the anti-scab buttons were not a call
to violence but rather a way "to express solidarity with the Union," "an invitation for people
who crossed the picket line not to do it in the future," or "a symbol that [the strikers] would
stick together if they had to go out again." Id. The administrative law judge, however, found
such explanations unconvincing against the background of abuses by other strikers. See id.
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3. A Proposal for Reform
The discipline rationale for banning union insignia must be
strictly limited. Although the Board's decisions are typically thought-
ful and well reasoned, 194 judicial opinions such as Boeing'95 subor-
dinate section 7 to speculative fears of conflict. Even the Board has
been insufficiently protective of the workers' rights. Although the
Board's concerns in United Aircraft'96 and Reynolds'97 are legitimate,
the solution is to punish those actively engaged in violent or threat-
ening behavior, not those merely wearing union buttons.
At some point the Board should draw the line. An employer
should be free, for example, to prohibit emblems that expressly
advocate and are likely to produce violence. 9 The Board and courts,
however, have withdrawn protection from buttons not expressly or
impliedly calling for any violence.
At their root, Boeing and its progeny embody the belief that
workers are Pavlovian creatures that will leap to violence at the
sight of union buttons. This belief insults the intelligence and de-
cency of union advocates that restrain themselves to peaceful forms
of protest.199 The discipline justification should therefore be limited
"' See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp, 300 N.L.R.B. No. 13 (Sept. 28, 1990) (emphasizing
that "general, speculative, isolated or conclusory evidence of potential disruption does not
amount to 'special circumstances"').
I" For a discussion of Boeing, see supra notes 143-150 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 176.
"7 See supra note 188.
Relying by analogy on constitutional jurisprudence, employers should be able to
prohibit a button that "is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per
curiam) (footnote omitted). The Brandenburg standard obviously would provide potent pro-
tection to workers wishing to express union sympathies. As Professor Tribe explains, "Laws
that on their face burden speech in terms of its content but do not limit their reach to the
sort of incitement noted in Brandenburg are void." LAUmENCE H. TRmE, AmEucAN CONSTI-
TrTioNAL LAW § 12-9, at 848 n.56 (2d ed. 1988).
Although the First Amendment applies only to speech regulated by government actors,
similar safeguards should be extended to private sector employment. As one scholar has noted,
"The exercise of ... managerial authority is closer, more regular, and often more salient to
the worker than is the exercise of government authority." See WmEUX, supra note 63, at 143.
' "Extremely few cases report workplace confrontations arising directly from union or
anti-union emblems. See, e.g., Purolator Prods., Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 694, 699-700 (1984)
(employee argued with supervisor that wore anti-union T-shirt), enforced, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2120 (4th Cir. 1985); Harrison Steel Castings Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 450, 461 (1982) (employee
tore union button from co-worker's jacket), enforced, 728 F.2d 831 (7th Cir.), and enforced
en banc as modified, 735 F.2d 1049 (7th Cir. 1984); Louisville Chair Co., 161 N.L.R.B. 358,
367-70 (1966) (employee insulted co-worker for wearing anti-union emblems), enforced, 385
F.2d 922 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968). The sparsity and trivial nature
of such instances underscore the unlikelihood that union buttons actually would disrupt
discipline.
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to prohibitions aimed at buttons that expressly advocate the use of
violence or other lawless action.
C. Maintaining Efficiency and Production
1. The Approach of the Board and Judiciary
Even when there is no fear of violence, employers have prohib-
ited union emblems on the grounds that they could distract employ-
ees from their tasks or otherwise interfere with production. The
Board repeatedly has rejected this defense when employers have
failed to substantiate their claims. ° In numerous other decisions,
however, the employer has prevailed before the Board or on appeal.
In Fabri-Tek, Inc. v. NLRB,201 for example, the Eighth Circuit
set aside the Board's finding that the employer had violated the
Act.m In this case, the manufacturer of computer components
permitted its employees to wear union buttons that were approxi-
mately one inch in diameter. 23 The employer, however, prohibited
buttons three inches in diameter, "vari-vue" buttons in which more
than one image appeared, buttons that had been fashioned into
earrings, and a blouse stenciled with a union slogan.2" The employ-
er's justification for prohibiting these kinds of insignia was that they
could distract employees from their delicate work, which required
great concentration. 5
The Board rejected this defense, holding that the employer had
violated the Act. As the trial examiner reasoned, the employer
permitted other activities that could disturb the workers' concentra-
tion, such as the use of buzzers to announce break periods, constant
paging of employees over the plant's loud speaker, and the passing
of various collection boxes.20 Furthermore, the employer had "failed
to prove its contention that the wearing of union insignia in the
See, e.g., Larand Leisurelies, Inc., 213 N.L.R.B. 197 (1974), enforced, 523 F.2d 814
(6th Cir. 1975); Swain Mfg. Co., 201 N.L.R.B. 681 (1973); Standard Fittings Co., 133
N.L.R.B. 928 (1961); Stewart Hog Ring Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 310 (1961).
-- 352 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1965), denying enforcement to 148 N.L.R.B. 1623 (1964).
21 See Fabri-Tek, Inc. v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1965), denying enforcement to
148 N.L.R.B. 1623 (1964).
See id. at 578-80.
See id. at 581.
See id. at 578-81.
See Fabri-Tek, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1623, 1629 (1964), enforcement denied, 352 F.2d
577 (8th Cir. 1965).
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plant had an effect of distracting the attention of other employees
or disrupting their work concentration." '
The Eighth Circuit disagreed.? The court noted that the em-
ployer had tried to prevent numerous forms of distraction by placing
"sneeze boards" on work tables, forbidding females from wearing
"short shorts," and "separating talkative women from each other." 2°9
These examples are instructive because they reveal the court's failure
to appreciate the importance of section 7. The court categorized
union buttons with sneezing, gossip, and sexually provocative attire
instead of recognizing the importance of the workers' right to display
union sympathy. In short, the court treated union buttons as a mere
nuisance and permitted the employer to strike preemptively before
production was affected. The court explained that the employer was
not obligated "to wait until its production records dropped and the
efficiency of its employees went down before concluding that [the
insignia] would have a tendency to distract. '210
This approach is misguided because it permits an employer to
allege that union buttons impede production as a pretext for quelling
union activity. In this sense, Fabri-Tek repeats the error of Harrah's
Club2" and Caterpillar1 2 by allowing an employer to override section
7 rights through conjecture. As a consequence, workers are left at
the mercy of an employer's self-serving appraisal of a button's effect
on productivity.213
The court also belabored the fact that the employees "never lost
their right" to wear the small "customary buttons. '21 4 This fact has
undeniable relevance because it shows that the employees remained
2 Id. at 1630.
- See Fabri-Tek, 352 F.2d 577.
I' See id. at 580. The court belittled the fact that the employer tolerated other sources
of potential distraction. It stated that "the fact that certain things may still remain to be
done" to remove distractions was no basis for criticizing the employer's actions regarding the
insignia. See id. at 587. The question left unanswered by the court is why the employer chose
to crack down on union insignia while ignoring more obvious threats to the workers' concen-
tration.
210 Id. at 584.
2 For a discussion of Harrah's Club, see supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
212 For a discussion of Caterpillar, see supra notes 151-161 and accompanying text.
211 Fabri-Tek emphasized the degree of concentration required of its workers and stressed
that producing defective goods could result in "great economic loss" to the company. See
Fabri-Tek, 352 F.2d at 579, 586. These concerns are clearly legitimate, but the court needed
to scrutinize whether the buttons raised a real risk of disturbance. Furthermore, the court
failed to examine the cost to the employees of having their section 7 rights circumscribed and
the damage done to the union's campaign efforts by the employer's prohibition.
214 See id. at 585.
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free to signify their support for the union. The problem with the
court's reasoning here is that it predicates the right to wear union
buttons on custom. This vague standard is of little comfort to
workers that risk being discharged if their buttons are deemed
uncustomary, because they are too large, numerous, provocative, or
otherwise beyond the pale.
The Board itself has often accepted the argument that union
buttons could interfere with production and quality control. The
Board's holding in Hanes Hosiery, Inc. 215 exemplifies how employ-
ees' section 7 rights have been limited despite evidence that an
employer's actions were unlawfully motivated. In Hanes, a foreman
repeatedly warned employees to remove or cover their Teamsters
campaign buttons, ostensibly because they could damage the yam
used in producing hosiery. 216 The employer defended this order by
demonstrating that damaged yam was a constant problem and that
it had taken other steps to minimize its occurrence. 2 7 In a ruling
adopted by the Board, the administrative law judge upheld the
employer's actions. Finding that the buttons presented a risk of
snagging the yam, he concluded that there was a legitimate business
reason for requiring that they be covered or removed. 218
This conclusion failed to respond to several pressing concerns.
As the administrative law judge conceded, the employer did not
consistently enforce its rule against wearing items that could damage
the yarn.29 The judge reasoned, however, that the inconsistency was
immaterial because the employer's "inefficiency on some occasions
does not warrant a finding that occasions of efficiency amount to
unfair labor practices even if some restriction of employee rights to
propagandize is involved."220 This reasoning is myopic because it
fails to recognize that the employer's heightened efficiency in ban-
ning-union buttons may have been motivated by a desire to quash
section 7 rights. The other ways in which the employer violated the
Act, such as by unlawfully interrogating employees regarding their
union sympathies and discriminatorily applying a no-solicitation
215 219 N.L.R.B. 338 (1975).
216 See Hanes Hosiery, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 338, 346 (1975).
2" See id. at 345-46. For example, workers were required to wear gloves and to cover
their watches. See id. at 346.
232 See id. at 347; see also Campbell Soup Co., 159 N.L.R.B. 74 (1966) (condoning ban
on insignia as lawful means to protect purity of food products), modified per curiam on other
grounds, 380 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1967).
2,9 See Hanes, 219 N.L.R.B. at 347.
2 See id.
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rule,2' supports this suspicion. Moreover, the administrative law
judge appeared eager to minimize the importance of the employer's
interference. He hypothesized, for example, that workers could have
satisfied the order to remove or cover the buttons by simply applying
a transparent substance.2 The employer, however, neither apprised
the workers of that unorthodox option2 nor assured workers that
their right to wear union emblems would be respected if they did
not endanger the product's qualityY'2
This failure to assure workers should be considered a violation
of the Act. When management limits its workers' freedom to exercise
section 7 rights, it should have the burden of communicating the
reason for that limitation and expressly advising the workers that
they may continue to wear buttons in ways that will not endanger
production standards. Employees then could appraise the legitimacy
of the employer's business justification and understand when they
could wear buttons without fear of reprisal. The Board, however,
did not consider this approachYm
The Board also affirmed an administrative law judge's ruling
without substantive comment in Magic Pan, Inc.26 In Magic Pan,
the complaint alleged that the employer had threatened to discharge
a crepe assembler unless he removed his union button. 7 The ad-
ministrative law judge dismissed this allegation on the grounds that
the employer's food handling and sanitation manual forbade kitchen
workers from wearing jewelry? 8
Such a conclusion hardly rises to the level of serious analysis.
At no point did the administrative law judge even allude to section
7 or the right to wear union buttons. Moreover, he failed to consider
whether the prohibition was necessary to preserve hygiene or had
been enforced in a discriminatory manner. Instead, without citing a
single authority, he ruled that the Act had not been violated.
The flaws of Magic Pan reappeared in the Board's 1985 Uni-
versity of Richmond 9 decision. In University of Richmond, the
-' See id. at 338-39, 347-50.
2 See id. at 347.
m See id. at 346.
- See id.
= See id. at 338-39.
242 N.L.R.B. 840 (1979).
- See Magic Pan, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 840, 847 (1979).
m See id. at 847-48. The administrative law judge also ruled that instead of threatening
to "discharge" the crepe assembler, the employer "merely told [him] he could not continue
working while wearing the button." Id. This distinction appears utterly semantic and the
administrative law judge made no effort to elaborate.
274 N.L.R.B. 1204 (1985).
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employer forbade employees that handled food from wearing jewelry
other than earrings and wedding rings3m The Board's general coun-
sel and the administrative law judge agreed that this rule was facially
valid because jewelry could carry germs and fall into food. The
general counsel asserted, however, that the employer had enforced
the rule in a discriminatory manner because it occasionally had
permitted employees to wear holiday pins and other jewelry23Y In
his opinion, the administrative law judge ruled that the employer
had not violated the Act. He concluded: "Given the clear justifi-
cation for the announced policy and evidence that even prior to the
organizational campaign the Respondent enforced this policy, albeit
imperfectly, I cannot conclude that the employees' Section 7 rights
were somehow interfered with by the Respondent."1 2
This conclusion assumes the existence of a "clear justification"
for the employer's policy. Certainly, earrings and wedding bands
could contaminate food, but neither the employer nor the adminis-
trative law judge explained why they should be allowed and union
buttons prohibited. The administrative law judge erred by uncriti-
cally assuming that union buttons are less legitimate than wedding
bands or even earrings.
Furthermore, the employer forbade union buttons even when
they posed no conceivable threat to food purity. One worker, for
example, was ordered to remove her button even though it was
placed under her hairnetY 3 Finally, although the employer did not
always compel workers to remove union buttons,2 4 this fact is of
little relevance. The employer failed to demonstrate the legitimacy
of any ban and should not be absolved of violating the Act simply
because it occasionally respected the rights of its work force.
In sum, the traditional approach to the efficiency and production
rationale is unsatisfactory. An employer has a legitimate interest in
maintaining the quality of its product, but in many cases the Board
and judiciary have not evaluated carefully whether union buttons
actually imperiled production. Furthermore, tribunals have paid scant
attention to the workers' competing interest in wearing buttons to
demonstrate their union sympathies. Finally, it is disturbing that the
Board often has affirmed the findings of administrative law judges
See University of Richmond, 274 N.L.R.B. 1204, 1210 (1985).
23, See id. at 1210.
23 Id.
21 See id. at 1210.
"4 See id.
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despite a clear lack of analysis. The Board's passivity in this area is
regrettable and provides little guidance as to how such cases should
be resolved.
2. A Proposal for a New Approach
To safeguard the interests of both management and labor, the
Board and courts should adopt the following approach. First, the
employer should have the burden of demonstrating by clear and
convincing evidence35 that a limitation on the right to wear insignia
is necessary to protect its product. This standard should prevent
employers from raising pretextual defenses and should lead tribunals
to examine each case with a critical eye. Second, any limitation on
union buttons must be narrowly tailored so as not to exceed the
legitimate reason for its enactment. Third, the employer must com-
municate the reason for the limitation to its workers and assure
them that it will otherwise respect their right to wear union buttons.
Finally, the employer must enforce its limitation in a nondiscrimi-
natory manner. Unless the Board and courts apply this mode of
analysis, workers will continue to be deprived of their section 7
rights without adequate justification.26
D. Preventing Safety Hazards
1. Weaknesses in the Board's Approach
Employers also have cited worker safety as a justification for
banning union insignia. The Board initially was wary of this argu-
23 In general, the clear and convincing standard means that the party on whom the
burden of proof rests must demonstrate that the truth of an asserted fact is highly probable.
As one scholar has explained, "The litigant upon whom this burden of persuasion is placed
should lose if the trier or triers of the fact are not convinced upon all the evidence that the
facts upon which his claim depends or his defense rests are highly probably true." J.P.
McDaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CAL. L. Rnv. 242, 254 (1944); see also
CHARLEs T. McCoMacK, HAMDB o c oF Tm LAw oF EvIDEN E § 340 (E. Cleary ed., 3d ed.
1984) (discussing the clear and convincing standard).
23 Employers engaged in manufacturing, packing, or holding human food may rely upon
21 C.F.R. § 110.10 (1989) as justification for limiting the wearing of union buttons. This
regulation requires such employers to ensure that workers remove "all insecure jewelry and
other objects that might fall into food, equipment, or containers." In Jennie-O Foods, Inc.,
301 N.L.R.B. No. 43 (Jan. 25, 1991), for example, the administrative law judge alluded to
this regulation in deciding that an employer lawfully ordered a worker to remove her union
button. In Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 301 N.L.R.B. No. 117 (Feb. 28, 1991), however, the
employer's reliance on the regulation failed because it applied its prohibition of jewelry in a
discriminatory fashion. As Pepsi Cola demonstrates, employers must not be permitted to use
the regulation as a pretext for banning union insignia.
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ment, but employers successfully have invoked it in recent decisions.
As in the cases involving alleged concerns for customer relations,
workplace discipline, and production, the Board has paid insufficient
attention to the workers' section 7 rights by validating this justifi-
cation under questionable circumstances.
The Board's Standard Fittings Co. 7 opinion exemplifies its
initial skepticism toward the safety rationale. In an opinion adopted
by the Board, the trial examiner reasoned:
The Respondents ... contend that the badges constituted a
safety hazard and that they could physically interfere with the
employees' work performance. However, other than some testi-
mony that employees are generally prone to industrial accidents
when working with machinery, there is no evidence to substantiate
this contention. Certainly, there is nothing indicative about the
badges to the naked eye which would impel this conclusion. Res-
pondents advance the theory that, insofar as the welders were
concerned, sparks from the blowtorches could cause the badges to
ignite or to explode. Again, there is no expert testimony to sub-
stantiate this contention. As the evidence stands, it does not appear
that the badges were any more flammable than the clothing which
the men wore. Respondent's [sic] contentions . .. appear to be
more in the nature of afterthoughts. Accordingly, and there being
no evidence to substantiate them, they are rejected.238
This approach is commendable, for the trial examiner properly
demanded that the employer's claims be supported by expert testi-
mony and he refused to let afterthoughts substitute for clear evidence
of an actual hazard. The same result was reached in Keller Alumi-
num Chairs Southern, Inc.29 In Keller, the trial examiner concluded
that an employee's union sign did not constitute a safety hazard and
held that his discharge for wearing it violated sections 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3) of the Act.m
In numerous other opinions, however, the Board has been more
receptive to employers' arguments concerning safety. In the 1965
- 133 N.L.R.B. 928 (1961).
21 Standard Fittings Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 928, 945 (1961). The trial examiner also rebuffed
the employer's assertion that the union badges had interfered with production. As he explained,
"inhere no doubt were some minor interruptions of production, but... these largely resulted
from management's interference with the right of employees to wear badges." Id. at 944
(footnote omitted).
2" 165 N.L.R.B. 1011 (1967), enforced per curiam, 425 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970).
m See Keller Aluminum Chairs Southern, Inc., 165 N.L.R.B. 1011, 1014-15 (1967),
enforced per curiam, 425 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970). As in Standard Fittings, the Board adopted
the trial examiner's conclusion without substantive discussion.
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Shelby Manufacturing Co.-41 decision, the trial examiner upheld the
suspension of a worker that had covered himself with at least a
dozen union stickers.2' 2 The trial examiner tersely stated, "Conceiv-
ably [the employee's] exhibitionism may have caused machine op-
erators to look around at him and thus endanger their operations.'"'23
The trial examiner's reasoning, however, was far from adequate.
The conclusion that union insignia could "conceivably" cause an
accident is not sufficient. As in Standard Fittings, the trial examiner
should have insisted on clear proof that the stickers actually pre-
sented a hazard. Moreover, assuming that such a hazard existed,
the employer should have explained this to the worker and reassured
him that he was entitled to wear a safe number of stickers. In this
manner, the employer could have safeguarded the workplace without
unduly infringing upon the worker's section 7 rights.
Unfortunately, Shelby is not an isolated holding. To the con-
trary, the Board has recognized the safety exception in a variety of
circumstances. The 1967 decision in Standard Oil Co., 2" for exam-
ple, upheld an oil refinery's prohibition against placing union insig-
nia on hard hats.245 In Standard Oil, employees wore hard hats
specifically marked to indicate their positions at the refinery. The
employer argued that these markings were crucial because, in the
event of a fire, its firefighting force could readily discern which
workers could render assistance in various parts of the refinery. The
employer then asserted that the union decals were prohibited because
they could obscure the refinery's markings.'-"
This justification is problematic because workplace safety is
indeed essential. The union decals, however, posed an unlikely risk.
As long as the decals did not cover the position markings, they
could not have hampered the firefighters' efforts. The Board, how-
ever, ruled for the employer on the following grounds:
-- 155 N.L.R.B. 464 (1965), enforced per curtiam in relevant part, 390 F.2d 595 (6th Cir.
1968).
See Shelby Mfg. Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 464, 474 (1965), enforced per curiam in relevant
part, 390 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1968).
21 Id. at 474 n.9. This holding was not appealed and was adopted pro forma by the
Board. See id. at 465 n.2. The trial examiner and Board agreed, however, that the employer
had violated the Act by suspending other workers that had worn fewer stickers. See id. at
465, 473-74. This aspect of the Board's opinion was enforced in NLRB v. Shelby Mfg. Co.,
390 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
- 168 N.L.R.B. 153 (1967).
-" See Standard Oil Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 153, 153 (1967).
1, See id. at 159.
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The Respondent established that it had a legitimate, longstanding,
and not unwarranted concern about the threat to safety posed by
the use of unauthorized decorations on work hats. Furthermore,
the evidence shows that employees were freely permitted to wear
emblems signifying union affiliation on any part of their clothing
except their safety hats. 247
The Board's reasoning has undeniable force. The employer ap-
peared to have a legitimate safety objective, and employees freely
wore other forms of union insignia. Yet, three aspects of the opinion
are disturbing. First, the refinery's rationale, that union decals could
obscure identification markings and thus delay response to a fire,
seems contrived. The employer did not allege that employees had
covered the helmet identification markings with union decals, and
no one testified to experiencing difficulty in seeing such markings.
The refinery's argument that the decals posed a hazard was therefore
unsubstantiated. Second, the refinery suppressed the insignia in a
discriminatory manner. Although the refinery took action against
workers that painted their hats or adorned them with pornography,
it appears that it did not consistently prohibit other forms of unau-
thorized, nonunion decorations.m The refinery's motive in prohib-
iting the union decals is thus questionable. Third, the workers' ability
to wear union insignia elsewhere on their clothing should not be
dispositive of the case. Without any clear evidence of a compelling
safety reason, the refinery simply had no right to interfere with the
workers' choice to decorate their hats instead of other clothing. By
permitting the refinery to ban decals from the hats, without adequate
evidence that they posed a hazard, the Board allowed employers
excessive control over the display of union insignia.2 9
In Andrews Wire Corp.,25° the Board followed Standard Oil. In
Andrews, workers had worn hard hats that stated their names,
protected them from falling objects, and were brightly colored to
increase visibility and thus prevent accidents.751 Five employees were
20 Id. at 153 n.I.
24 See id. at 156-60 (describing various humorous stickers employees wore on helmets).
m See also Clover Indus. Div. of GTI Corp., 188 N.L.R.B. 252 (1971). In Clover, the
Board held that the employer did not violate the Act when it instructed an employee to remove
a large union button, which ostensibly could be dangerous around machinery, but permitted
her to wear smaller insignia. Id. at 252-53.
- 189 N.L.R.B. 108, enforced per curiam sub nom. United Steelworkers of America v.
NLRB, 79 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2164 (4th Cir. 1971).
21 See Andrews Wire Corp., 189 N.L.R.B. 108, 113, enforced per curiam sub nom.,
United Steelworkers of America v. N.L.R.B., 79 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2164 (4th Cir. 1971).
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discharged when they attached United Steelworkers insignia to their
hard hats and refused to remove them .2 2 The Board held that the
employer had acted lawfully because the insignia could have pre-
sented a hazard by making the hard hats more difficult to see and
the workers freely wore union insignia on other parts of their
attire. 2 3
This decision overruled the trial examiner's carefully reasoned
opinion that found a violation of the Act. As the trial examiner
explained, the employer's supposed safety concern had little force:
the sticker did not make the hats less visible; the employer had
permitted other decorations on hats before the union began its
campaign; and the employer even had discharged a worker whose
Steelworkers insignia was placed inconspicuously under the hat's
brim.3 Moreover, the employer had failed to explain the alleged
concern for safety to all members of the workforce when he de-
manded that the sticker be removed.25 As the trial examiner ex-
plained, "[E]ven assuming such special circumstances existed, it was
incumbent upon the Respondent to advise the employees why it was
ordering them to give up a protected right. ' '2 6
Indeed, the employer's prohibition of union insignia appeared
to be part of a larger effort to discourage support for the Steel-
workers. The employer banned the insignia within seven days of the
representation election, harshly condemned the Steelworkers and
their supporters, and unlawfully discharged a union organizer.2 In
= See id. at 108.
2 See id. at 109.
2m See id. at 116.
255 See id.
- Id. (quoting Mayrath Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1628, 1630 (1961), enforced as modified,
319 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1963)). In Mayrath, the Board rejected the employer's argument that
it had lawfully ordered employees to remove their union buttons because they were interfering
with production. The Board stated:
Though we agree with the Trial Examiner that Respondent did not prove
the special circumstances which might warrant its orders to remove the buttons
or leave the plant, we also are of the opinion that, even assuming such special
circumstances existed, it was incumbent upon Respondent to advise the employ-
ees why it was ordering them to give up a protected right. Instead, Mayrath,
without advising the employees as to his alleged reasons, peremptorily ordered
them to remove the buttons or leave. The reasonable inference from this is that
if the employees did not remove the buttons, they would be discharged. By such
peremptory order, we find, Mayrath conveyed to the employees the idea that
they had no right to wear the buttons at work and gave them a Hobson's choice
of either foregoing [sic] the protected right or being discharged.
Mayrath, 132 N.L.R.B. at 1630 (footnote omitted).
2 Andrews Wire, 189 N.L.R.B. at 116-17. The Board affirmed the trial examiner's
finding that the employer unlawfully had discharged the union organizer. See id. at 108.
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light of these abuses, the trial examiner was justified in concluding
that the prohibition of insignia "was void of valid business consid-
erations and was inherently destructive of important employee
rights."s 8
An employer's stated concern for safety is not inevitably a
subterfuge for suppressing union support. Some instances show that
an employer's need to prevent a hazard can be both real and
immediate. In Brown Mfg. Corp.,219 for example, the employer
ordered a welder to remove approximately fifteen to twenty union
stickers from his attire. Because these flammable paper legends
could have endangered the welder's life, the administrative law judge
concluded that the employer had not violated section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. 21 The employer apparently explained its concern for safety and
did not order the worker to remove all of his stickers,2 2 so the
intrusion on section 7 rights was minimal and justified.
In many cases, however, the Board has accepted an employer's
rationale without critically appraising its validity. Fluid Packaging
Co.,2 a 1980 decision, exemplifies this predilection. In this case,
the employer ordered an employee to remove a large union sign
from her back, arguing that it was causing a dangerous distraction.2 4
The administrative law judge upheld this order without discussing
whether the employer's claim was legitimate or merely pretextual.2
This bald conclusion, without any legal reasoning or examination
of the surrounding circumstances,2 failed to protect section 7 rights.
The Board's decision in Kendall Co.67 further demonstrates the
precarious position of the right to wear union insignia. In Kendall,
the employer maintained a dress code to limit the wearing of jewelry
See id. at 117.
-" 235 N.L.R.B. 1329, 1331-32 (1978).
- See Brown Mfg. Corp., 235 N.L.R.B. 1329, 1331-32 (1978).
2' See id. at 1332.
See id. at 1332 & nn. 8 & 10.
247 N.L.R.B. 1469 (1980), enforced, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2279 (3d Cir. 1981).
Fluid Packaging Co., 247 N.L.R.B. 1469, 1474 (1980), enforced, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2279 (3d Cir. 1981).
20 See id.
21 The order to remove the sign occurred amid repeated violations of the workers' rights.
For example, the administrative law judge found that the employer had violated the Act by
discriminatorily discharging union supporters, interrogating employees regarding their concerted
activities, threatening to move or close the plant if the union became the workers' bargaining
agent, and engaging in numerous other coercive acts. See id. at 1480. Such contempt for
section 7 rights obviously raises questions regarding the employer's motive for banning the
sign.
267 N.L.R.B. 963 (1983).
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and other items that could endanger employees by becoming snared
in machinery.m In accordance with this rule, the employer ordered
an employee to remove a keychain that contained a union slogan.
The administrative law judge held that this violated section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. Although he acknowledged that the keychain could pose
a safety hazard, he emphasized that the employer had not explained
this peril to the employee and had not consistently enforced its dress
code against nonunion items. 269
The Board, however, disagreed.20 Based on Hanes Hosiery,27'
the Board concluded that the employer's occasional past lapses in
enforcing its dress code did not render its presently considered
actions discriminatory.m Furthermore, the Board held that the em-
ployer adequately informed the employee of its safety concern by
informing the worker that he had violated the dress code.273
The Board's reasoning is problematic. As in Hanes Hosiery, the
Board ignored the possibility that a facially neutral rule had been
applied in a discriminatory manner. An employer cannot enforce its
rules with perfect consistency, but questions of discriminatory motive
should be treated seriously in cases of disparate application against
union supporters. The issue of discriminatory motive was particu-
larly acute in Kendall because the employer had violated the same
worker's rights in numerous other ways. 274 Viewed together, the
employer's harassment of the worker and spotty enforcement of its
dress code indicate that the employer was motivated by anti-union
animus rather than a legitimate concern for safety.
2. A Proposal for Reform
Cases such as Kendall underscore the inadequacy of the Board's
approach. The Board has been too complacent in accepting employ-
ers' claims of danger and too slow to appreciate facts suggesting
anti-union intent. Workplace safety is a pressing concern, but it
must not be used as a pretext for suppressing section 7 rights. While
respecting an exployer's need to eliminate genuine hazards, tribunals
20 See Kendall Co., 267 N.L.R.B. 963, 963-964 (1983).
10 See id. at 968-70.
ro See id. at 963-65.
' For a discussion of Hanes, see supra notes 215-25 and accompanying text.
77 See Kendall, 267 N.L.R.B. at 965.
2 See id.
27 The Board concluded, for example, that the employer violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (a)(3)
of the Act by repeatedly warning and suspending that worker in retaliation for his union
activities. See id. at 963-66.
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must not permit the rights of unibn supporters to be unreasonably
curtailed.
The best approach to this predicament would be for tribunals
to adopt the same proposal offered in cases concerning alleged
threats to production. The employer should have to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the union emblems pose an actual
safety hazard. Furthermore, the limitation on insignia must be non-
discriminatory and narrowly tailored to enhance safety. Finally, the
employer must be required to inform workers of the reasons for the
limitation and assure them that they may continue to wear union
insignia when it will not present a hazard.
This proposal, of course, is not infallible. Hard cases will con-
tinue to arise when the necessity for banning buttons is debatable.
Nonetheless, the proposal would at least provide tribunals with an
analytical framework for deciding such cases in a principled and
consistent manner. Employers would be discouraged from imple-
menting unnecessary prohibitions and workers would be assured that
their rights would not be extinguished by pretextual safety concerns.
CONCLUSION
The right to wear union insignia in the workplace has been
undermined by numerous Board and judicial opinions. These deci-
sions have belittled the practical and symbolic importance of union
emblems while uncritically accepting employers' self-serving concerns
for customer relations, discipline, production, and safety.? 5 Indeed,
the simple union button has been treated as a malevolent boi t&t6,276
capable of frightening the public, instigating violence, destroying
production, and endangering the lives and limbs of workers. In
addition to circumscribing the protective scope of section 7, such
opinions imply that the right to display union buttons is a privilege
that easily may be eliminated.
"5 Tribunals also have revealed a low regard for union insignia by repeatedly dismissing
employer interference as de minimis. See, e.g., Yeargin Constr. Co., 271 N.L.R.B. 725, 726
(1984) (finding no violation when supervisor told employee that wearing union badge could
"be hazardous to his health"); Phillips Indus. Components, Inc., 216 N.L.R.B. 885 (dismissing
foreman's tearing of union sticker from employee's toolbox as "an isolated event"), enforced,
91 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2194 (7th Cir. 1975); Gold Merit Packing Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 205 (1963)
(finding no violation from foreman's implication that employees could improve working
conditions by removing union buttons); Ohio Aviation Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 1142 (1955) (finding
no violation when supervisor told employee wearing union button to "shove it up" the body
of another union advocate).
"6 A mythical fire-breathing ox from Brazilian lore. See, e.g., JoRGE AmAoo, THE
VioLENr LAND 275 (S. Putnam trans. 1988).
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This subordination of the right to wear union insignia must not
continue. As a matter of social policy, the Board and courts must
not condone practices that unnecessarily undermine the ability of
unions to garner and maintain support. As one scholar has observed,
organized labor is "the only agency in this society which can prevent
the growth of absolutism in industry which inevitably spreads when
power is unrestrained." 2n By affording employers an ever-growing
power to prohibit union symbols, the Board and courts are facili-
tating an ominous movement toward managerial absolutism in the
workplace.278
Stripping workers of their right to wear union insignia also takes
its toll on their individual dignity. As Paul Weiler perceives, "For
the employee work is ... a major source of personal identity and
satisfaction, of his sense of self-esteem and accomplishment, and of
many of his closest and most enduring relationships." 279 When em-
ployees are forbidden from peacefully signifying their union sym-
pathies, they relinquish a fundamental aspect of that personal identity.
This needless subjugation of individual autonomy can only fuel
feelings of resentment and alienation in the workplace. m
A new approach toward union symbols is in order. The customer
relations rationale for banning buttons should be abolished because
it embodies the unjustifiable assumptions that signs of union support
are undignified, unpopular, and jeopardize employers' economic
health. The discipline justification should also be abandoned except
for emblems expressly calling for lawless behavior. Employers right-
217Pm, T -r, ORGAN=ZE LABOR IN AmERCAN HISTORY 709 (1964).
The continuing decline in union membership has drawn the attention of numerous
scholars, See, e.g., GoLDmmD, supra note 61.
For example, Weiler asserts:
Since 1955 .... private sector union membership has not only declined somewhat
in absolute numbers, but its share of the ever-increasing labor force has been
cut fully in half from over thirty-eight percent in 1954 to just nineteen percent
in 1984. Absent some dramatic changes in this trend, the supposed right to
engage in collective bargaining will be largely illusory by the turn of this century
for non-union private sector workers.
Paul Weiler, Milestone or Tombstone: The Wagner Act at Fifty, 23 HARv. J. ON LEcus. 1, 3-
4 (1986) (footnote omitted).
As Weiler realizes, this decrease in unionism shows no sign of abating. According to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, "union membership stood at 16.1 percent of total employment in
1990, down from 16.4 percent estimated for 1989." Union Membership Down to 16.1 Percent,
136 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 174 (Feb. 18, 1991).
27 WEnER, supra note 63, at 143.
- For an insightful discussion of worker alienation, see ROBERT ButmER, ALIENATION
AND FREEDoM (1964).
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fully concerned with keeping order can concentrate on removing
actual hoodlums rather than silencing peaceful expression. Concerns
for productivity and safety should be treated differently because in
some instances union buttons could directly jeopardize an employer's
product or the health of its employees. Even in these cases, however,
the Board and courts must rigorously appraise employers' concerns
and insist that justifications for bans be supported by clear and
convincing evidence.
These proposals are hardly a panacea for the multitude of
troubles confronting the nation's work force. If section 7 and Amer-
ican workers are to receive the respect they deserve, however, pro-
viding adequate protection for the right to wear union insignia is a
step in the right direction.
